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In the end of February 2014, the Crimean peninsula of Ukraine was plunged into conflict 
when pro-Russian separatists began systematically seizing and segregating the peninsula from 
the Ukrainian government.  Working alongside the separatists were the “little green men” or 
“polite men” as the press dubbed them.  Carrying modern Russian Federation military equipment 
and speaking in Russian, yet wearing masks and no identifying insignia, these men were believed 
to be regular Russian Federation soldiers working incognito amongst the civil unrest in the 
interest of the Russian Federation.1 The world watched in amazement as a well-orchestrated and 
planned territorial take-over of Crimea began.  By the end of March 2014, the Crimean peninsula 
would, to the objections of Kiev, declare itself independent, and seek and gain admittance to the 
Russian Federation. 
 A little over a decade prior, the Russian Federation’s military was scaled back to 10% of 
the defense activities (e.g. deployments, exercises, training, etc.) which it had been carrying out 
in 1989 under the Soviet Union.2  Then President Boris Yeltsin had abandoned his county’s 
capability to engage rivals abroad in lieu of internal security.3  Additionally, during the breakup 
of the failed Soviet Union, the Russian Federation retained control of only 50-60% of the 
USSR’s total force, the remainder being divided (likely simply along the lines of which state it 
happened to be in at the time of the collapse) among the fourteen newly independent states of the 
former Union.4  Further, by 1996, only 5% of the Russian Federation’s forces were fully 
operable.5 
 These two stories of the same state, separated in time by such a short amount, begs the 
question – how did this happen?  How can a state which spent two decades struggling to rebuild 
its government, under the pretenses of a peaceful transition and future, emerge in the third 
decade as a strong, modern, sophisticated, and revisionist state, capable of executing a 
coordinated invasion of another state?  Further, was this event foreseeable?  Did the Russian 
Federation give any clue of its intention or capability?  All of these questions have merit and 
interest; however, this author believes the chief question among them is should the west have 
seen the Russian military resurgence coming?  The answer, quite simply, is yes. 
 Like almost all complex and interesting events in history, the explanation for the Crimean 
annexation and the revisionist stance of the Russian Federation today hinges on multiple factors.  
First, leadership matters.  The Russian President since 2000 has been Vladimir Putin, sans his 
four year period as Dmitry Medvedev’s Prime Minister from 2008-2012.  Vladimir Putin’s 
history and rise to power have deep meaning for the Russian military resurgence.  Born to a 
NKVD veteran of WWII and a career KGB officer himself, Putin embodies many “muscovite” 
or even Soviet beliefs.  Most importantly, he is a strong believer that a unipolar world is an 
inherently instable system.  Putin’s historic example of stability was the Cold War, a bipolar 
system with the US and the USSR atop competing hierarchies.  More recently, the concept of a 
multipolar system has gained acceptance in the Russian Federation.  Russian Foreign Minister, 
                                                          
1 Shevchenko, Vitaly. “‘Little Green Men’ or ‘Russian Invaders’?” BBC News, BBC, 11 Mar. 2014, 
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26532154.  
2 Rosefielde, Steven, and Hedlund, Stefan. Russia since 1980: Wrestling with Westernization. Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge UP, 2009. Print. World since 1980.  Pg. 127. 
3 Rosefielde, Steven, and Hedlund, Stefan. Russia since 1980: Wrestling with Westernization. Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge UP, 2009. Print. World since 1980.  Pg. 128. 
4 Jordan, Amos A, Taylor, William J., and Mazarr, Michael J. American National Security. 5th ed. Baltimore, Md.: 
Johns Hopkins UP, 1999. Print.  Pg. 352. 
5 Jordan, Amos A, Taylor, William J., and Mazarr, Michael J. American National Security. 5th ed. Baltimore, Md.: 
Johns Hopkins UP, 1999. Print.  Pg. 353. 
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Sergei Lavrov was quoted in 2018 as saying, “The United States needs to face the difficult 
reality that it is no longer the world’s only superpower and adapt to an increasingly multipolar 
world.”6  Whether looking historically at a bipolar system or predicting a future of a multipolar 
system, Putin believes that the system has Moscow as a pole.  He believes that internal and 
external threats to the Russian Federation are linked, working in concert to undermine the 
interests of the Federation.  Finally, he believes in highly centralized control and that the fall of 
the Soviet Union was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century.”7  Vladimir 
Putin’s background and rise to the highest office in the Russian Federation played a significant 
part in the military resurgence of the Russian Federation. 
 Second, threats matter.  After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the 
Warsaw Pact, the west’s security alliance, NATO was the largest successful security alliance in 
the world.  NATO formed as a security alliance to counter Soviet aggression in Europe and 
North America.  From its origins, the power of article V of its charter stood as a bulwark against 
Soviet military force.  “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in 
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they 
agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or 
collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist 
the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other 
Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and 
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”8  While NATO existed to counter Soviet 
aggression, without a Soviet state in existence, the Russian perception was that NATO now stood 
to ensure nothing resembling the power the Soviet state possessed could ever be resurrected in 
Russia again.  When NATO began to expand eastward toward, and eventually into, the former 
Soviet Bloc of Europe, the Russian Federation saw a security threat crawling closer to its 
borders.  The perceived security threat posed by NATO assisted in the Russian Federation’s 
military resurgence. 
 Third, world geopolitics matter.  No event in history occurs in a vacuum.  Everything 
happens concurrently with other world events and has multiple causes and outcomes due to those 
events.  The early twenty-first century was marked by the Global War on Terror (GWOT).  The 
events of September 11th, 2001 would shape a significant portion of world geopolitics for the rest 
of the decade.  These changes would herald both new areas of cooperation amongst old 
adversaries, and would also spark protracted conflict which would revolutionize military strategy 
and structure.  Undoubtedly, this new security environment contributed to the Russian military 
resurgence; but more importantly, it was the circumstances in which the military resurgence 
occurred, and therefore the resurgence cannot be analyzed without examining the new security 
environment concurrently. 
 Despite this complex web of intertwining narratives, should the west have seen the 
Russian military resurgence coming?  The answer, quite simply, remains yes.  Multiple factors, 
explored in detail in both this case study and the accompanying annexes, were the key indicators 
                                                          
6 “U.S. Must Accept a New, Multipolar World Order, Russian Foreign Minister Says.” Los Angeles Times, Los 
Angeles Times, 15 Jan. 2018, www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-russia-lavrov-20180115-story.html. 
7 “Europe | Putin Deplores Collapse of USSR.” BBC News, BBC, 25 Apr. 2005, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4480745.stm.  
 
8 Nato. “The North Atlantic Treaty.” NATO, www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.  
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that the Russian military resurgence, and by extension the military actions in Crimea, were 
foreseeable. 
 
1. Who Putin was before politics.  Vladimir Putin was a career KGB officer who dreamed of 
being a spy.  Intelligence and statecraft are intertwined disciplines; however, the KGB 
was much more than simply an intelligence organization, and its officers were more than 
just spies. 
2. Putin’s record as a bureaucrat in the St. Petersburg and Federal governments.  By all 
accounts, Putin’s rise was aided by his unwavering, and in many ways likely criminal, 
loyalty to those around him. 
3. The rise of US unilateralism.  In direct conflict with Putin and the Russian Federation’s 
belief in the stable order exists with Moscow as a pole in a non-unipolar system, these 
actions would affect the security dilemma within the Federation. 
4. Putin’s centralization of power within the federal government.  Again, leadership matters, 
but also the type of leadership in place matters.  The erosion of democratic institutions 
and rise of authoritarian systems within the Federation was the theme of Russian 
governmental transformation in the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
5. The continued enlargement of NATO.  As previously mentioned, the enlargement of 
NATO was likely seen as an external threat to the Russian Federation.  During the 1999 
and 2004 rounds of enlargement this remained mostly an international debate, never 
sparking more than a “protest in principle” from the Russian Federation government.  
However, the discussion of Georgia and Ukraine in the NATO alliance was a significant 
escalation of this perceived threat. 
6. Putin’s warnings of 2006 and 2007.  Before his combined Federal Assembly in 2006 and 
before an international security conference in 2007, Putin laid out his vision of how the 
world should work, and where it is falling short. 
7. The Russian Federation’s actions in Georgia in 2008.  As the first occurrence of the use 
of Russian forces after Putin’s centralization of power, the means and methods employed 
in Georgia tell a story of Russia’s objectives to counter NATO. 
 
 This case study is structured to illustrate a conclusion – that the Russian military resurgence 
was foreseeable by the west.  Below are the key indicators and how they should have each shown 
the west that the Russian Federation was going to resurge, was currently resurging, or had 
completed its resurgence and ready to or already exercising power beyond its ability a mere ten 
years earlier.  For deeper analysis of these key points, Annexes A-D provide more detailed 
accounts of the factors which lead to the Russian Federation’s revisionist behavior. 
 
Who Putin was before Politics 
(Supported in detail by Annex B) 
 
 Vadim Bakatin, a former KGB chief once said, “The KGB, as it existed, could not be 
termed a secret service.  It was an organization formed to control and suppress everything and 
anything.  It seemed to be created especially for organizing conspiracies and coups, and it 
possessed everything necessary to carry them out: its own specially trained armed forces, the 
capacity to track and control communications, its own people inside all essential organizations, a 
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monopoly on information, and many other things.”9  This was the organization which enticed 
Vladimir Putin from a young age.  He sought out employment there and studied law in college, 
the most likely field from which the KGB would recruit.  Putin is even quoted as saying that his 
affinity for the KGB is how a single Intelligence Officer could “rule over the fates of thousands 
of people.”10 
 Putin was a loyal KGB officer who had even served on foreign assignment to Europe, a 
highly desirable opportunity not all KGB officers received.  He worked in the “illegal 
intelligence-gathering unit”, using assumed identities and falsifying documents.  Putin was a spy, 
perhaps not in the romantic spy novel sense, but in his own words he was “a pure and utterly 
successful product of Soviet patriotic education.”11  Who Putin was before politics showed his 
secretive nature and his desire for centralized control within the state. 
 
Putin’s Record as a Bureaucrat in the St. Petersburg and Federal Governments 
(Supported in detail by Annex B) 
 
 From his start in the mayor’s office in St. Petersburg, Vladimir Putin has shown his true 
nature as a bureaucrat.  In his capacity as deputy mayor to Anatoly Sobchak, Putin oversaw 
foreign trade and governmental information flow.  These functions were traditional to positions 
given to “active reserve” officers of the KGB.  Planted among all institutions in the USSR, the 
active reserve were a “nearly uncountable and possibly uncounted number”12 of KGB officers 
hidden within the civilian structures of the state. 
 From this posting, Putin over saw a billion dollar natural resource export kickback 
scheme.  His office entered into contractual agreements with companies to export Russia’s 
natural resources in return for food to be imported to St. Petersburg.  When none of the food 
arrived, a councilwoman of the St. Petersburg government submitted her investigation into Putin.  
Her findings only accounted for 10% of the Moscow-authorized exports had direct evidence of 
$92 million worth of resources and $34 million in commissions to the third-party companies, and 
no record of food being delivered to the people of St. Petersburg.  Amazingly, Putin survived this 
investigation, despite it reaching all the way to Boris Yeltsin’s desk. 
Putin not only survived the investigation, but was promoted to a position within the 
federal government in Moscow.  He would eventually end up directing the FSB, the state 
intelligence service which assumed the functions of the KGB after the collapse.  Putin’s FSB 
during this time ensured the political safety of Boris Yeltsin and his closest advisors by blocking 
investigations into corruption within the Kremlin.  Putin’s record as bureaucrat showed his 
disregard for the rule of law and the people of Russia, and highlighted his favoring of political 
loyalties and power. 
 
The Rise of US Unilateralism 
                                                          
9 Gessen, Masha. The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin. First Riverhead Trade Paperback 
ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 94. 
10 Gessen, Masha. The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin. First Riverhead Trade Paperback 
ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 59. 
11 Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, Gevorki︠ a︡n, Natalii︠ a︡, Timakova, Natalʹi︠ a︡, Kolesnikov, A. V., and Fitzpatrick, 
Catherine A. First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-portrait by Russia's President Vladimir Putin. New York: 
PublicAffairs, 2000. Print. PublicAffairs Reports.  Pg. 42. 
12 Gessen, Masha. The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin. First Riverhead Trade Paperback 
ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 93. 
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(Supported in detail by Annexes C & D) 
 
 Two major acts of US unilateralism in the early twenty-first century lead to a sense of 
insecurity in the Russian Federation and a build-up of military capability.  First, the US decision 
to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and to push for the development of a 
national missile defense (NMD) system sparked concern over the balance between US and 
Russian strategic forces.  Further, once the systems were developed and the US chose to deploy 
them in Poland and the Czech Republic (later to Romania instead), the Russian Federation saw 
these systems as designed to neutralize the threat of Russian strategic missile systems.  From 
their vantage, the placement in Eastern Europe could only mean that these systems were intended 
to counter Russia, despite the US stating that their placement shows that they could not counter 
Russian Strategic forces. 
 Second, the US’ invasion of Iraq in 2003, while supported by a coalition, was not a UN 
Security Council approved resolution and therefore, by Russian standards, an unacceptable 
unilateral action.  Putin’s long held belief that the true nature of a stable international system was 
bipolar was in direct conflict with the US taking unilateral actions.  Without a Russian “check” 
to US actions, the world was witnessing an “almost unconstrained hyper use of force – military 
force – in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent 
conflicts.”13  The rise of US unilateralism showed the increased perceived threat that Putin and 
the Russian Federation felt. 
 
Putin’s Centralization of Power within the Federal Government 
(Supported in detail by Annex D) 
 
 While the Russian Federation had been attempting to implement democracy since the 
dissolution of the Soviet state, under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, many if not all of this 
work was reversed.  In the first two months alone, Putin issued eleven presidential decrees, six of 
which were military in nature.  From removing the no-first-strike policy from Russia’s nuclear 
doctrine, to reinstituting mandatory training for the reserves, Putin began his centralization of 
power with the reinvigoration of the Russian armed forces. 
 By 2004, Putin would consolidate all forms of power inside the Russian Federation.  By 
forcing the CEOs of large energy companies to turn over control of their companies to the state, 
Putin seized the most lucrative economic resource in Russia.  By extending the same tactic to the 
media moguls, Putin grabbed control of the television channels and newspaper outlets and by 
extension the information flow in the country.  By instituting proportional representation 
elections in the Duma, shifting the Federal Council to appointees, planting presidential 
appointees as envoys to oversee the regional governors, and creating the Public Chamber to 
review legislation before it was passed to the Duma, Putin secured end-to-end control of the 
political machine in Russia.  Putin’s centralization of power showed him executing a plan to 
dismantle democracy and install authoritarian control in the Russian Federation. 
 
The Continued Enlargement of NATO 
(Supported in detail by Annexes A, C, & D) 
                                                          
13 “Putin's Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 
12 Feb. 2007, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html?noredirect=on. 
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 The expansion, as is phrased in Russian terms, of NATO is the expansion of a threat to 
the Russian Federation, as seen from the Russian perspective.  NATO was the security alliance 
to counter Soviet aggression in Europe, and the perspective of the Russian Federation that it 
existed after the collapse of the Soviet Union only to ensure that the Russian Federation remains 
weak is easily understandable.  Much was done on the part of NATO and the US to work with, 
not against, the Russian Federation; however, much was also done which was instigative. 
 NATO, while discussing the enlargement of including Poland, the Czech Republic, and 
Hungary, in the 1990s, sought to engage the Russian Federation as an equal.  NATO and the 
Russian Federation found the common ground in Bosnia.  Working side-by-side, these two once 
sworn enemies were able to interoperate for the sake of European security.  Unfortunately, this 
was short lived.  When NATO conducted its second round of enlargement, culminating in the 
admission of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004, the 
Russian Federation now felt a push against its border from the Cold War alliance. 
 Continuing its plans eastward, NATO again pursued a path of high irritability to the 
Russian Federation.  In 2005, NATO began discussion of extending membership to Ukraine and 
Georgia, something that was just intolerable to the Russian Federation.  The continued 
enlargement of NATO was another example of the increased perceived threat to the Russian 
Federation. 
 
Putin’s Warnings of 2006 and 2007 
(Supported in detail by Annex D) 
 
 In the event that the Russian military resurgence or the growing displeasure from the 
Kremlin was not clear to the west, Vladimir Putin clearly gave warnings of the future in 2006 
and 2007.  First, to his own combined Federal Council and Duma, the Federal Assembly, Putin 
outlined his complaints with the west’s actions.  Hinging on the continued NATO expansion, the 
rising unilateralism of the US, and the claims of space-based weaponry development, Putin’s 
warning was underscored by his subtext – the Russian Federation is not being treated as the 
equal it perceived itself to be in a bipolar system it believed to exist. 
 In 2007, before the 43rd annual Munich conference on security policy, Putin laid these 
complaints out for the world leaders.  “I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have 
any relation with the modernization of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe.  
On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust.  And 
we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended?”14  After discussing the 
changes to the international security situation, Putin said two short and clear indications of the 
resurgence of a revisionist Russia.  On the heels of describing how a unipolar world is 
undemocratic by lending itself to unilateralism, Putin said “of course, such a policy stimulates 
and arms race” and “It is obvious that in these conditions we must think about ensuring our own 
security.”15  Putin’s warnings of 2006 and 2007 were clear articulations that the Russian 
                                                          
14 “Putin's Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 
12 Feb. 2007, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html?noredirect=on. 
15 “Putin's Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 
12 Feb. 2007, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html?noredirect=on. 
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Federation was willing to act on behalf of its national interests and that many of those national 
interests are not in line with the interests of the west. 
 
The Russian Federation’s Actions in Georgia in 2008 
(Supported in detail by Annex D) 
 
 Regardless of the prior indications and warnings of the Russian military resurgence, the 
Georgian War in 2008 should have been the ultimate guide post of future Russian actions.  While 
courting NATO membership, Georgia began to use it forces to maintain peace in two of its semi-
autonomous regions – Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  Russia deployed it forces into the region 
after stating that ethnic Russians were being mistreated and that Russian Peacekeeping forces 
had suffered casualties at the hands of Georgian forces.  Correct or not, it is the actions taken by 
Russia after the deployment of these forces that matters. 
 First, the Russian forces in the regions began to systematically destroy captured Georgian 
military equipment.  Next, Russia formally recognized both regions a sovereign states and began 
diplomatic relations with them.  These two acts, regardless of any others, created two conditions 
for Georgia.  First, it hampered their ability to contribute militarily to NATO provided they had 
been admitted.  Second, for good measure, by formally recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
as sovereign states, Georgia was immediately involved in a border dispute.  The Russian 
Federation, by military action of swift politics scuttled any possibility of NATO expansion on its 
southern border.  The Russian Federation’s actions in Georgia showed that the resurgence of the 
Russian military was complete enough for the Federation to begin using force to counter the 




 In February 2014, the Russian Federation invaded the Crimean peninsula, seizing 
military bases and equipment, and created an immediate border dispute for Ukraine.  Just as the 
Federation had done six years prior in the caucuses, Ukraine’s eligibility to draw closer to the 
west and its possibility of joining NATO were crushed. 
 This event was a surprise to many in the world, but as this case study shows it should not 
have been.  A Gallup poll taken from 2008 to 2019 showed the “awakening” that the Crimean 
annexation brought to the west.  When asked “what one country anywhere in the world do you 
consider to be the US greatest enemy today?”, the responses were indicative of this awakening.  
In 2008, only 2% of respondents felt as though the answer was Russia; however, in 2015, 18% 
now felt Russia was the US’ greatest threat.  Interestingly, where was the threat in 2008 
according to this poll?  A combined 47% said the threat was from Iran or Iraq.16  This surge in 
the perception of Russian threat shows that the key indicators of the first decade of the twenty-
first century were largely overlooked or outright ignored by the west.  
 The Russian military resurgence of the twenty-first century was not a secretive effort, nor 
was it something that should have taken the west by surprise.  Many factors led to not only why 
the Russian military resurged, but also as to why the west was blind-sided by it.  Leadership, 
specifically Vladimir Putin, truly matters.  Without his KGB trained personality and desire for 
centralized control, it may not have been possible to rebuild the Russian military.  Threats, 
                                                          
16 Gallup, Inc.  “Russia.” Gallup.com, news.gallup.com/poll/1642/Russia.aspx.  
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specifically NATO enlargement, matters.  Without the perceived provocation from an external 
threat, Putin would likely have never been able to consolidate power as aggressively as he did, 
nor would he have likely been able to spend so much on defense budgets without public 
backlash.  Finally, world geopolitics, specifically the GWOT, truly matters.  The US and NATO 
spend almost the entire first decade of the twenty-first century engaged in a war against global 
terrorism.  The required focus on the asymmetric threats and challenges posed by global 
terrorism left little bandwidth remaining for the contemplation of a possible resurgent Russia.  
Further, by branding itself a partner in the GWOT, the Russian Federation found common 
ground with the west and used this cooperation as leverage against outside influence and 
criticism as well as internal leverage for defense spending and the centralization of control. 
 Leadership, threats, and geopolitics help provide and answer as to why the Russian 
Federation resurged militarily in the twenty-first century, but the question as to why it seemed to 
blind-side the west is far more challenging.  As this case study shows, multiple key indications 
lead up to the resurgent Russian military of the 2010’s.  Who Vladimir Putin was before his 
political career, his handling of politics and the power of his governmental postings, the 
increased unilateralism by the US during the GWOT, Putin’s near-complete consolidation of 
power as president of the Russian Federation, and NATO’s continued push eastward in its 
ideological attempt to unite Europe under a security alliance should have been strong enough 
indicators of the pending future.  Yet, surprisingly, they were not heeded, and even more 
indicators were given.  Putin gave clear warning of his ideals differing greatly from the common 
values held at the time in the west not once, but twice.  Finally, the Georgian War of 2008 
showed that the Russian Federation was capable to now act in its interests via the use of force 
and was willing to do so, even if those interests conflicted with the west’s plans or interests. 
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Annex A - Why Did NATO Enlarge? 
 
 Following the withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany, the first decision for the 
west was the terms of German unification.  Associated closely with the question of reunifying 
Germany was the understanding that with the unification, the eastern boarder of NATO would 
expand toward the Soviet Union.  It is contested as to whether the west gave assurances to the 
Soviet Union during the German unification that the eastern front of NATO would or would not 
expand any further.  In 1990, Secretary of State James Baker stated “NATO would not expand 
one inch to the east”.  However, as Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson and Mark Kramer debated in 
2017, with the remainder of the Warsaw Pact in place at the time of the quote, it is difficult to 
determine if Secretary Baker was pledging to not expand NATO past Germany or if the thought 
of NATO east of Germany was even in the minds of leaders in the east or west and therefore, not 
a pledge at all.17  Regardless of the possibility of a pledge, the west would come to a debate 
concerning the enlargement of NATO after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet 
Union. 
 With a Russian Federation in transition from the years of Soviet governance, yet still 
militarily strong and still very much a nuclear power, the decision to enlarge the security 
architecture built in 1949 to counter Soviet aggression eastward was not a light one.  
Specifically, 50-60% of the former Red Army was under direct control of the Russian 
Federation.18  Two competing thoughts sat on the sides of this debate.  First, the non-
expansionist idea was that any increase to the territory of NATO would undoubtedly frustrate the 
Russian Federation.  More liberal interpretations of this idea believed that enlargement was 
possible, but not in isolation from NATO working more closely with the Russian Federation.  On 
the opposite side, history showed that if a power vacuum existed in Central and Eastern Europe, 
then old alliances would be likely to form resulting in a despotic balance of power style 
structure.  Adding to the seriousness of this thought, the aforementioned statistic works in 
reverse, 40-50% of the former Red Army was now divided among fourteen newly independent 
states, a majority of which were in Eastern Europe.  The more liberal interpretations of this side 
of the debate believed that while full NATO membership was likely too aggressive to stand for 
Russia, that a middle ground approach needed to be developed in order to not allow the balance 
of power structure to surface again in Central and Eastern Europe.  This path came to fruition via 
the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the establishment of state “requirements” for NATO 
membership consideration. 
 Since the enlargement of NATO today is of historic fact, the question exists as to what 
was the critical reason why the expansionist ideal won out?  The first theory to be explored here 
is that the German-championed thought that without NATO enlargement into Central and 
Eastern Europe, a power vacuum would manifest and lower the security of the continent further 
than an infuriated Russia.  The competing theory is that the PfP and “requirements” set forth for 
NATO membership, once achieved by prospective NATO members, pinned the existing NATO 
states into allowing membership or risk international embarrassment for both the rejected state 
and NATO as a whole.  This analysis will flesh out these two ideas and make a case for which is 
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the most likely single reason for the NATO enlargement following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. 
 
Part I – 1999 NATO Enlargement 
 
The Power Vacuum Theory 
 
 After Germany was reunited, NATO spanned from the Atlantic to the edge of Central 
Europe.  Russia, again still relatively strong and still nuclear-capable, was retrenched behind its 
own boarders.  The void of Central and Eastern Europe was now littered with independent states 
like Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, Hungary, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Bulgaria.  
These states had historic roots in existence, many of them had existed prior to World War Two 
and World War One.  However, since the establishment of the Eastern Bloc and the Warsaw 
Pact, these states have been run as satellites of the USSR and therefore were under the collective 
security arrangements of the Warsaw Pact and the nuclear umbrella of the Soviet Union.  Now, 
for the first time in fifty to eighty years, these states emerged as independent and began to seek 
their own security. 
As it stood in the early 1990’s, Central and Eastern Europe, without an invitation to join 
the largest and only surviving security organization in Europe would organize themselves along 
“balance of power” lines.  In Germany, this thought was prevalent.  As Eyal states, “Bereft of 
any serious institutional affiliation, the countries of the region would begin to construct their own 
security arrangements. What would these arrangements have looked like? Very likely they would 
have resembled the ones which had already plunged Europe into two world wars in this century: 
Poland and Romania (the two biggest countries in the region) against Russia, Slovakia and 
Romania against Hungary, and the Czechs with the Poles in order to deflect Germany’s 
influence.”19  Germany, with its keen historical understanding of Central and Eastern Europe 
(ironically earned from their thrice exploitation of the region for the benefit of Germany since 
1870) was a champion of this thought.  The alternative to offering these new independent states 
the protection from not only outside aggression but from inter-region conflict amongst each other 
via NATO was historically unpalatable to German politicians.  “Germany would have then been 
faced with the option of either participating in Central Europe's local alliances or reaching a deal 
with Moscow in order to keep the region under control”20.  The unwieldy nature of multiple 
unilateral alliances was not an ideal situation, especially considering that it was one of the 
leading causes to hurtling Europe into World War One (and to a lesser, but still important, effect 
World War Two).  Alternatively, Germany engaging the Soviet Union to ensure the two could 
manage and “control” Central and Eastern Europe under a pair of agreed upon spheres of 
influence felt strikingly similar to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939. 
Germany saw the problematic future of Central and Eastern Europe, was geographically 
positioned on its boarder, and through an astute understanding of European history pushed the 
NATO alliance to expand into these states.  Volker Ruhe, Defense Minister of Germany, wrote 
in the NATO Review in June of 1993, “To me, that is no longer a question of principle but rather 
one of timing and of the conceptual framework. What we need is a clear understanding of our 
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common interests, values and political ideas. Our aim must be to fill the security policy vacuum 
to the East of NATO and to enhance stability throughout the region.”21 
 While Germany was a prime foothold of this thought, it was not alone.  The concept that 
Central and Eastern Europe needed inclusion in NATO else they would fall into precarious local 
alliances and turmoil was held in the US and the former Eastern Bloc as well.  Henry Kissinger 
wrote in 1994 that “Failure to expand NATO in the near future is likely to prove irrevocable. 
Russian opposition is bound to grow as its economy gains strength; the nations of Central Europe 
may drift out of their association with Europe. The end result would be the vacuum between 
Germany and Russia that has tempted so many previous conflicts.”22  Here to, like in Germany, 
an elder statesman of the United States sees the future problem of leaving Central and Eastern 
Europe to devise its own form of security structure.  Interestingly, Kissinger recommends that 
NATO not just pursue the inclusion of certain former Warsaw Pact states (i.e. Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary – the “Visigrad” countries), but also a treaty of non-aggression 
between NATO and Russia.23  This is the same thought that was historically impossible for 
Germany to act upon unilaterally, due to its semblance of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.  
However, if pursued as a “whole of Europe” approach, might have a level of credibility the 
German state was unable to produce. 
This thought even looked like it would come to fruition in 1994, when the Russian 
Federation signed on to the PfP.24 The PfP was founded in January 1994 with a dream that 
“partners would see ethnic wars like the one in Bosnia as a common security problem and would 
cooperate as partners solving it, rather than designating proxies and taking sides as in the Cold 
War”.25  In the Bosnian conflict in 1995, the unthinkable actions of the Cold War were made 
real.  Russian forces worked alongside NATO forces.  Through rather clever statesmanship and 
military-to-military connections, Russia’s role in Bosnia (specifically, within the NATO mission 
in Bosnia) was established in mutually agreeable terms.  NATO was concerned about the “unity 
of command”, meaning that ultimately all forces in a region and under a mission would report to 
a common leader.  The idea of Russian forces taking direct orders from western officers was 
unpalatable.  Colonel General Shevtsov and General Joulwan worked the details smartly, the 
Russians would be under the operational control (OPCON - the assignment of missions and rules 
of engagement) of General Joulwan, like the rest of the NATO contingent, but via Colonel 
General Shevtsov and therefore outside of the normal NATO channels; however, the Russians 
would be under the tactical control (TACON – the minute-by-minute orders to accomplish tasks 
given via OPCON) of Major General Nash, who commanded a multinational force of Russian, 
American, and other NATO forces.26  This provided the unity of command that NATO 
demanded, but allowed the Russians to assign their own forces and operate “with, not under” 
                                                          
21 Ruhe, Volker. “Europe and the Alliance: Key Factors for Peace and Stability.” NATO Review, vol. 41, no. 3, June 
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26 Carter, Ashton B., Carter, Ashton B, and Perry, William James. Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for 
America. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999. Print. Pg. 44. 
  Russian Military Resurgence in the 21st Century 
  Richard J. DaPrato 
   
13 
 
NATO in their eyes.27  Just ten years prior, the thought of Russian forces working with NATO 
would have been absurd; yet, here in the middle of a Slavic-Muslim-Croat ethnic conflict true 
cooperation between former Cold War adversaries was occurring and the PfP was working. 
In the former Eastern Bloc, Romania stood out in 1993, when Dr. Teodor Melescanu, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, wrote in the NATO Review about the rising violence 
which existed in the Balkans and the role which Romania and other potential NATO members 
played in controlling it.  “None of the new democracies bordering former Yugoslavia - Albania, 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania - should be punished by neglect. Each of them has played an 
important part in preventing the war from spreading throughout the area and beyond. These 
states' ability to preserve - against heavy odds - their domestic stability, and their contribution to 
the international efforts to curb and stop the conflict, should not be overlooked.”28  Dr. 
Melescanu was showing two things of importance in the power vacuum theory.  First, that the 
power vacuum already existed and that violence due to that vacuum had already broken out.  
And second, noble democratic states (including Romania) were on the front lines of containing 
the violence in a manner consistent with NATO norms and values. 
 The rebuttals to the power vacuum theory are difficult to flesh out, since NATO began 
the PfP in 1994 and admitted new states into its membership ranks in 1999, thus filling the power 
vacuum within a few years of its creation.  However, Kissinger points out the downside risk that 
expansion would alienate Russia.29  This overarching fear is somewhat dissuade due to President 
Boris Yeltsin’s letter to President Bill Clinton in 1993.  “We understand, of course, that any 
possible integration of east European countries into NATO will not automatically lead to the 
alliance somehow turning against Russia.  NATO is not being viewed as a bloc in opposition to 
us.  […] In the long run, it should probably not be ruled out that even we would join NATO.30  It 
is plausible to stand in the shoes of current leaders in the early 1990s and see the danger of a 
power vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe as greater than the reaction of Russia’s elite to 
NATO enlargement. 
 
The Path to Membership Forcing Acceptance Theory 
 
 The competing theory of NATO enlargement is that once NATO outlined its 
“requirements” for membership and prospective states achieved those requirements, NATO was 
forced to expand or suffer international backlash and credibility issues.  This started with the 
PfP.  While the PfP has never described itself as a path to membership, it does brand itself that 
way.  “The PfP was established in 1994 to enable participants to develop an individual 
relationship with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation, and the level and pace of 
progress.”31  The idea of “pace of progress” is a path to “progressing” to membership.  Even the 
1993 Strategy for NATO Expansion outlined that the North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
                                                          
27 Carter, Ashton B., Carter, Ashton B, and Perry, William James. Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for 
America. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999. Print. Pg. 44. 
28 Melescanu, Teodor. "Security in Central Europe: A Positive-Sum Game." NATO Review 10 1993: 12. ProQuest. 
Web. 5 May 2019. Pg. 14. 
29  "Expand NATO Now." The Washington Post (1974-Current File) [Washington, D.C.] 1994: A27. Web. Pg. 4. 
30 “Retranslation of Yeltsin Letter on NATO Expansion.” Translated by Marvin Russell, The National Security 
Archive, 15 June 2015, www.nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=4390818-Document-04-Retranslation-of-Yeltsin-
letter-on.  
31 Nato. “Partnership for Peace Programme.” NATO, 7 June 2017, 
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm#.  
  Russian Military Resurgence in the 21st Century 
  Richard J. DaPrato 
   
14 
 
(NACC) should be consulted with during the process of expansion.32  The NACC was formed in 
1991 to begin the dialogue between NATO and “partner” states of the former Warsaw Pact.  
According to the NATO 1995 Study on Enlargement, the following tenants must be met for 
membership into NATO: “a functioning democratic political system based on a market economy; 
the fair treatment of minority populations; a commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts; 
the ability and willingness to make a military contribution to NATO operations; and a 
commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutional structures.”33 
 The example of this theory was Romania, specifically their bid for acceptance into 
NATO at the same time as the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.  In 1996, the Romanian 
government actively pursued membership in NATO under the guidelines of the 1995 study on 
Enlargement.  As Eyal illustrates, “Romania took NATO's membership conditions at face value, 
and proceeded to dispose of every objection which the Alliance raised in its path.”34  Romania 
had launched a campaign to meet the NATO requirements and be the first in line to full 
membership.  Three years prior, Dr. Melescanu wrote “we are quite aware that no decision can 
be implemented without the support of public opinion in the Alliance's member states. Those of 
us in the Cold War's 'forgotten' part of Europe can therefore help in better acquainting our 
Western friends with our security needs and concerns, and also with the way in which our 
eventual membership could serve NATO's values and goals.”35  Romania was making the 
ultimate play, under not only the “rules” set forth by NATO and the NACC, but also in the 
political and public diplomacy domains.  They understood, as Dr. Melescanu said the importance 
of the “support of public opinion” of the member states.  Romania at this time sent their exiled 
king, Michael, on a tour of European capitals in order to drum up publicity and public support.36  
It seemed that all of the requirements were checked and Romania would soon be on the ballot for 
membership. 
However, as Dr. Melescanu said, public opinion of the member states matters.  Any 
enlargement to NATO would require ratification by the member states governments.  Again, it 
seemed as though Romania had achieved support.  The French supported the Romanian request 
very quickly, and was shortly followed by Greece, Turkey, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, and 
Canada.37  Unfortunately, the United States was a holdout in support for Romanian membership.  
Instead, the US threw three other states in the ring for consideration, all of whom had obtained 
the NATO “requirements” – The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.  The rational for these 
states is two fold.  First, they had been pursuing a closer relationship with NATO since at least 
1992, as Lubos Dobrovsky, the Czechoslovak Defense Minister was quoted as saying in NATO 
Review – “Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary are very serious in applying for membership of 
NATO, but NATO hesitates, sets conditions and time limits and generally carries on as if the 
whole thing were a misunderstanding, regardless of the fact that we, like Poland and Hungary, 
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have made it unequivocally known that we regard NATO as an important stabilizing element in 
Europe.”38  By 1996, when Romania was adhering to the rules of NATO to garner public support 
for membership, these three states had been pushing for years.  Hence, why US Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright announced that these three states would be supported before Romania 
because “applicant countries must meet the criteria for a longer period of time than a few 
months.”39  Regardless, it would take until 1999 for the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to 
achieve full membership, at least seven years after their initial push to do so.  Romania would 
follow in the next round of admissions in 2004, approximately eight years after its initial bid. 
The rebuttal to the path to membership forcing acceptance theory is murky, like the 
power vacuum theory, since the states which bid for acceptance were accepted.  Additionally, 
these states were accepted along similar timelines from their initial bids and attainments of the 
requirements set forth in the 1995 Study on Enlargement.  However, because there doesn’t seem 
to exist any specific backlash to the initial rejection of states which completed the requirements 
like a checklist, this theory appears to fall apart when viewed across a longer time period. 
 
Part II – 2004 NATO Enlargement 
 
 In 2002, NATO announced that it would begin a new round of admissions for 
membership to include seven states.  Most controversially, this included states which were part 
of the former Soviet Bloc.40  Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia were all issued Membership Action Plans.  All of these states had existed within the 
Soviet sphere of influence during the Cold War, whether directly as Soviet territory or as states 
under Communist Party rule.  These states were in keeping with the NATO membership 
“requirements”, but the question stands a why would NATO pursue another enlargement which 
would undoubtedly alienate the Russian Federation, which as of this time began waning in its 
PfP participation (a possible sign of distancing from its relationship with NATO)?  As of 1999, 
former Secretary of Defense William Perry and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global 
Strategic Affairs Ash Carter said, “Russia has only seldom and reluctantly joined in these 
activities [PfP military-to-military activities], and it has not taken the lead in forging 
relationships with the militaries that have taken the place of its former Warsaw Pact allies.”41 
 Two theories contend here for the historical rational of the second round of enlargement.  
First, the theory that the US believed the Russian Federation to be a pseudo-partner in global 
affairs, but by no means a peer, and would only oppose the enlargement in principle.  With the 
recent and/or concurrent successes of the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
treaty and the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) it stands to reason that the Russian 
Federation would seek to accept the US decisions, even if they opposed them in principle.  
Second, the theory that the US pursued the new enlargement under a budding concept of the 
“freedom agenda” and without much strategic consideration or understanding of the 
consequences.  The US at the time was working fairly well with the Russian Federation as 
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mentioned above in terms of arms control, and President Bush put great emphasis on his personal 
relationships, describing Putin as “an honest, straightforward man who loves his country” and 
Bush felt as though he had “a sense of his soul”.42  These facts lead one to see that the US may 
have been inclined to push foreign policy which, likely provocational to the Russian Federation, 
satisfied US interests without great concern for peer or other great powers interests in mind. 
 
Pseudo-Partner in Global Affairs Theory 
 
 The ABM treaty of 1972 stated that a comprehensive, national missile defense (NMD) 
system was illegal for either the US or the USSR (and by de facto after 1991, the Russian 
Federation) to possess.  The treaty was a pledge in the Cold War from both sides that neither 
would seek to undermine the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) principle.  Since the 
declaration by President Reagan to develop such a system, the US plans to do so were never truly 
realized or abandoned by either subsequent presidents George H.W. Bush, or Bill Clinton.43 
 While campaigning for his presidency, George W. Bush said that Russia was “a great 
power and must always be treated as such”.44  With relation to the ABM treaty, he campaigned 
comparatively to this thought saying that while he was in favor of developing a NMD system, he 
wished to amend the treaty in consultation with Russia.  However, he went further saying that “if 
Russia refuses the changes we propose, we will give prompt notice, under the provisions of the 
treaty, that we can no longer be a party to it.”45  Regardless, in December 2001, likely hastened 
by the rapidly changing security situation after 9/11, the US announced that it was unilaterally 
abrogating from the ABM treaty.46  Interestingly, instead of sparking hardline rhetoric akin to the 
days of the Cold War, Putin’s response to the abrogation was that “I fully believe that the 
decision taken by the president of the United States does not pose a threat to the national security 
of the Russian Federation”.47  Multiple authors believe this to be a sign that at least some, if not 
significant, effort had been taken prior to the statement by President Bush to ensure the Russian 
President would disagree in principle, but not outwardly chill the U.S.-Russian relationship. 
 Another shining example of U.S.-Russian relations at the time was the cooperation over a 
shared enemy, global terrorism.  Vladimir Putin’s leadership came front stage during the Russian 
counter-terrorism (CT) efforts in Chechnya during the fall of 1999.  After a Saudi-born Islamist 
launched a 1500 man attack into Dagestan in the Caucasus Region, Russian President Boris 
Yeltsin promoted a little known FSB Director, Vladimir Putin, to the position of Prime Minister 
to “tackle the problem” in Chechnya.48 A more detailed analysis of Putin’s origins and rise to 
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power are explored in Annex C.  When the US began exploring options to destroy al Qaeda and 
the Taliban in Afghanistan who harbored them, they found a friend in Putin, who had been 
branded as a “hero” against terrorism in Chechnya during his presidential campaign in 1999, and 
the Russian Federation.  Geographically, Russia was able to provide overflight rights directly 
into Kazakhstani, Kyrgyzstani, and Uzbekistani territory, the central Asian states from which the 
US would launch its campaign.49  While the Russian’s felt as though these states were within 
their sphere of influence, as former Soviet SSRs, the US never formally recognized such a fact.  
However, deference was given by the US during the CT campaign by seeking Russian 
Federation agreement to US basing military forces in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.50 
 Through these foreign policies, it can be seen that the US treated the Russian Federation 
as a partner in global affairs, ranging from arms control and nuclear deterrence to CT and the 
fight against global terrorism.  However, it can equally be articulated that the US did not see the 
Russian Federation as a hurdle to foreign policy, one which acquiescence must be achieved 
before any action can be taken as was much more the case with the USSR during the Cold War.  
Logically, to the point of NATO’s second round of enlargement, it is plausible that the US saw 
the issue as achievable despite likely Russian objection.  With so many areas where the US was 
able to achieve its goals and carry out its desired actions without anything more than a “protest in 
principle” from the Russian Federation, why would the enlargement of NATO (a security 
alliance to which the Russian Federation was a PfP member) cause any greater a negative 
reaction? 
 
“Freedom Agenda” without Strategic Consideration and/or Understanding Theory 
 
 The “Freedom Agenda” wasn’t fully branded, named, and articulated until sometime in 
2004 leading up to George W. Bush’s second presidential election; however, the thoughts that 
composed it were developing prior to that in President Bush’s first term and therefore during the 
second round of NATO enlargement.  President Bush summarized the Freedom Agenda in that 
“freedom is not this country’s gift to the world; freedom is the Almighty’s gift to every man and 
woman in this world.  And as the greatest power on the face of the Earth, we have an obligation 
to help the spread of freedom.”51  This statement by the President has two elements worth 
considering.  First, it is said in a Messianic, “light vs. dark” tone, one which would not just 
galvanize a right-wing American voting base, but also one that comes from a deeper part of 
someone’s belief structure.  Second, when compared to the NATO requirements for membership, 
it is easily applicable, because NATO membership carried with it the ideals of democracy and 
peaceful coexistence within the Alliance. 
 President Bush long held Christian views as part of his basis of belief structure.  As 
pertaining to his relationship with Putin, Bush had two examples from 2001 that showed even 
then he held these Christian values closely.  First, in his meeting with Putin in Slovenia, he spoke 
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of “getting a sense of his soul”.52  He didn’t say he got a sense of his character or his ideals, he 
said a sense of his soul.  Second, during the same meeting, President Bush recounted a moment 
with Putin where the Russian Federation president showed him a crucifix given to him by his 
mother.53  The symbolism of the Christian values and the aforementioned value of his personal 
relationship with Vladimir Putin shows how deeply seated these beliefs were in President Bush’s 
character. 
 The NATO requirements for membership include “a functioning democratic political 
system based on a market economy; the fair treatment of minority populations; a commitment to 
the peaceful resolution of conflicts” as its first three tenets.54  “Freedom” and “democracy” are 
often interchangeable in American political dialogue, the care for your fellow man is a mainstay 
Christian value, and the peaceful resolution of conflict is the third and reason for NATO’s 
existence, as outlined by William Perry and Ash Carter in Preventive Defense – “NATO’s 
historic role of drawing members together, encouraging them to resolve disputes peacefully, and 
fostering respect for democratic values and institutions.”55  These similarities lend themselves to 
the conclusion that the US’ decision to push for the second round of NATO enlargement was in 
line with the flourishing Freedom Agenda, as the idea would soon come to be called. 
 Whether the Bush Administration conducted foreign policy without strategic 
consideration or understanding of other states’ interests is again an idea which fully manifests 
after the conclusion of the second round of NATO enlargement, yet had multiple ties to the 
2000-2003 timeframe.  Looking back at the “Pseudo-Partner in Global Affairs” theory, the string 
of successes the US had in gaining in its national interests with very little, if any, ramification 
from the Russian Federation is evident.  Additionally, the focus of the Bush Administration was 
clearly on the GWOT, not on a great power competition with Russia.  A more detailed analysis 
of the US’ strategic focus from 2000-2010 is located in Annex D.  “During the period 2001-
2003, senior Bush administration officials, from the president down, had little to say about 
political conditions inside Russia.  After 9/11, maintaining cooperation in the ‘War on Terror’ 
clearly took precedence.”56  During this time, the administration must have been feeling a sense 
of success as well.  As noted after President Bush won reelection in 2004, “[President Bush] had 
denied al Qaeda a safe haven.  He had unseated the Taliban and Saddam Hussein.  Afghanis and 
Iraqis had voted in free elections. […] Relations with China, Russia, and India were good.  More 
than three and a half years had passed without a new terrorist attack on U.S. soil.  In Bush’s 
mind, the American people had witnessed these successes and rewarded him for it.”57 
 The building confidence in a leader who has achieved so many of his foreign policy aims 
with such a little amount of retort from great powers like the Russian Federation must steadily 
increase the penchant of the leader to act without concern for the great power’s consideration.  It 
is feasible to think that with the addition of each foreign policy success which the US completed 
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without a reaction greater than “disagreement in principle” from the Russian Federation 
eventually lead to a bolder belief that the Russian Federation would very rarely, if ever, take 
action opposing the US’ actions.  For this reason, it is logical to see the budding concept of the 
Freedom Agenda being pushed unilaterally without a concern or understanding of the greater 
geopolitical consequences. 
 A clear rebuttal to this theory are the actions of 2004 and the Ukrainian political crisis.  It 
was widely held that the Russian Federation was tempering in the Ukrainian presidential election 
in favor of the Russian-leaning candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, including a possible poisoning 
attempt on the EU/US-leaning candidate, Viktor Yushchenko.  The Russians believed that the 
US interfered in the election on behalf of Yushchenko, allowing his victory in a run-off.58  While 
this seems to support rather than refute the theory, the rhetoric after concerning Russia from the 
administration could hardly been seen as anything which would have been believed to elicit 
simply a “oppose in principle” response.  President Bush said “Vladimir is going to have to make 
some hard choices, and I think it’s very important for the American President as well as other 
Western leaders to remind him of the great benefits of democracy.”59  He went further following 
his own reelection in the US saying “it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the 
growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate 
goals of ending tyranny in our world.”60  It is almost undoubtable that the Russian president took 
this to mean that Ukraine is a democracy under the protection of the US’ Freedom Agenda and 




 NATO enlargement as an action was a controversial and debated topic.  However, the 
deciding reason for enlargement is an interesting question between a future prediction of 
instability, to which NATO enlargement was the answer, and one of NATO-aspiring states 
“forcing” NATO’s hand by very proactively pursuing membership. 
 As the analysis above highlights, the merits of both these theories for initial NATO 
enlargement exist in volumes; however, the rebuttals to the arguments are the deciding factor to 
their importance.  The Power Vacuum theory stands taller than the Path to Membership Forcing 
Acceptance theory due to an undeniable characteristic – historical example.  The precursors to 
both World War One and Two included a relatively weak Central and Eastern Europe pinned 
between a stronger (and at least loosely aligned) Western Europe and Russia/USSR.  
Additionally, both pre-world war Central and Eastern Europe existed under unilateral, local 
security agreements.  These conditions resurfacing in the post-cold war era, and the Germans, 
among others, drawing them forward as historical example was key to the enlargement of 
NATO. 
 Similarly, the analysis above shows that for the second round of NATO enlargement, the 
Pseudo-Partner in Global Affairs Theory stands taller than the “Freedom Agenda” without 
Strategic Consideration and/or Understanding Theory.  The impetus for this conclusion is that 
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the former theory hinges on the fact that the US worked closely and agreed often with the 
Russian Federation when it came to matters of CT, using this improved relationship garnered 
from such cooperation to the US’ advantage by spreading democracy and western style security 
vis-à-vis NATO’s second round of enlargement.  Whereas the latter theory hinges on the fact that 
the Bush administration pushed its ideological foreign policy abroad, only seeking cooperation 
with the Russian Federation where it deemed beneficial to the US, and countering the 
Federation’s foreign policy when the two came into conflict.  Further, the second theory suggests 
that effectively the US’ policy was to treat its relationship with the Russian Federation, with the 
second largest nuclear arsenal in the world and vastly important geopolitical significance to 
NATO enlargement, as a pawn – to be used for benefit when necessary, but sacrificed when the 
larger strategic aim necessitated it. 
 It is far more likely that the US acted as it historically has with its foreign policy – find 
cooperation when partners can agree and support democratic values, especially when within 
what it deems as its sphere of influence.  Hence, the enlargement of NATO, whether in 1999 or 
2004, was conducted on the basis of cooperating with newly formed states which sought to 
solidify their security situations under the largest security alliance in the world while becoming 
more democratic and with the Russian Federation on the CT mission in Central Asia, while not 
sacrificing democratic values in other states, essentially creating proxies resembling the Cold 
War. 
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Annex B - Why Did Vladimir Putin Come to Power? 
 
On December 31st, 1999 the acting president of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, 
became the elected president of the Russian Federation.  While a seemingly small promotion 
from acting president to president, the course of President Putin’s rise was nothing short of 
meteoric.  Born in Leningrad to a father who was factory laborer and former NKVD veteran of 
WWII and a mother who worked unskilled labor, Vladimir Putin grew up in a “lavish” (by the 
standards of Soviet Russia at the time for a family of three) 12 foot by 15 foot flat on the fifth 
story of an apartment in central Leningrad.61  He was a poor student who spent much of his time 
fighting and playing in the courtyard of the apartment building.  “I was a hooligan”62 Putin 
would later describe himself in his biography. 
Regardless of his origins, it is historic fact that Vladimir Putin would find his way from 
an apartment in central Leningrad to the prime seat in the Kremlin.  Two competing theories 
suggest how he managed his accent.  First, through a combination of KGB assignments and a 
FSB plan, the KGB Plant / FSB Plot Theory supposes that his rise was a calculated and crafted 
series of promotions undertaken to place him, an intelligent KGB officer, at the highest levels of 
government.  While this may seem far-fetched, plenty of historic evidence suggests some 
startling truths within it.  Vadim Bakatin, a former head of the KGB once said, “The KGB, as it 
existed, could not be termed a secret service.  It was an organization formed to control and 
suppress everything and anything.  It seemed to be created especially for organizing conspiracies 
and coups, and it possessed everything necessary to carry them out: its own specially trained 
armed forces, the capacity to track and control communications, its own people inside all 
essential organizations, a monopoly on information, and many other things.”63  Another theory 
which holds significant weight is the Loyalty and Luck Theory.  Among many things Putin 
values, loyalty seems to be one of the highest.  His history is fraught with examples of either him 
showing resolved loyalty, even in the face of illegal or immoral actions, to others or of others 
giving or repaying resolved loyalty to him.  As the author Angus Roxburgh puts it, Putin moved 
from the Mayoral offices in St. Petersburg to the Kremlin bureaucracy in Moscow through “a 
combination of luck and acquaintances”.64 
This analysis will seek to flesh out these two theories, while tracing the significant stops 
in the historic narrative along Vladimir Putin’s rise to power.  For a more detailed analysis of 
Putin’s ability to consolidate and centralize power after his election to the Presidency, please see 
Annex D.  In this analysis, one theme surfaces regardless of the legitimacy of either theory.  
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The KGB Plant / FSB Plot Theory 
 
 Putin aspired to be a KGB officer, specifically a spy, from a very early age.  His father 
had been a part of the NKVD “subversive troops” sent to disrupt the Germans from behind the 
front line and Putin had grown up on his father’s harrowing stories. In fourth grade, Putin signed 
up for German Language classes as an elective, despite being a poor student, an early sign of 
ambition to serve abroad.65  He even kept a portrait, according to a childhood friend, of Yan 
Berzin on his desk at school.  Berzin was an early Bolshevik, the father of Soviet military 
intelligence, and the creator of spy outposts in all European countries.66  At sixteen, Putin visited 
the local KGB directorate in Leningrad seeking employment.  After being told that the KGB 
recruits vice taking volunteers, Putin set out to attend Leningrad University where he would 
study Law, as advised by the KGB officer with whom he had spoken.67  At the end of his time in 
university, the KGB approached Putin and offered him a position, which he accepted.  Regarding 
his elation at being selected for his life-long ambition, Putin said “I didn’t tell him that I had 
dreamed of this moment since I was a schoolboy.  I didn’t tell him, because I remembered my 
conversation with the KGB office long ago: ‘we don’t take people who come to us on their own 
initiative.’”68 
 Putin spent the first four and a half years as a KGB agent assigned to an intelligence unit 
in Leningrad, a rather unceremonious “backwaters” posting.69  After biding his time, his first 
foreign assignment came with a posting to Dresden, Germany.  Even though he was working for 
the so called “illegal intelligence-gathering unit”, where agents used assumed identities and 
falsified documents, the work was drab due to the location of Dresden.70  Putin’s highest 
achievement during his time in Dresden was the network of connections he built of Colombian-
born nationals to a Colombian-born US Army sergeant, who in the end provided the KGB with 
an unclassified manual in exchange for 800 marks.71  The Putins were ordered back to Leningrad 
in 1990 on the eve of German unification, an event which Putin felt was disastrous to his state 
and his beliefs– “the land [he] had been sent here to guard would just be handed over to the 
enemy.  Everything [he] had worked for was now in doubt; everything he believed was being 
mocked.”72 
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 Putin returned to Leningrad University, but would only remain for three months – he was 
about to begin a career as a bureaucrat.  Multiple stories exist how Anatoly Sobchak, the mayor 
of St. Petersburg (which was the name Leningrad returned to after 1991), a former law professor 
at Leningrad University, and a pro-democracy advocate came to hire Vladimir Putin into the St. 
Petersburg government.  According to Sobchak, he noticed Putin at university, remembered him 
from his days as a student, and courted him into working for the government.73  In Putin’s 
version, he met with Sobchak in his office, “told him everything” (assuming to include his 
current status within the KGB), and Sobchak decided to hire him.74  This is the first article of 
proof supporting this theory.  Anatoly Sobchak was the leader of the pro-democracy city of St. 
Petersburg, and he himself was a pro-democratic politician.  The murkiness of the details which 
surrounds Putin’s entrance into the city’s administration casts doubt on its legitimacy.  Surely, 
the KGB which Bakatin previously described would have a vested interest in having an officer 
within the ranks of such a counter-communist movement. 
 Putin quickly rose to the position of Deputy Mayor to Anatoly Sobchak.  His duties were 
centered about two major functions.  First, he controlled foreign trade and investment for the city 
and second, he controlled information flow into and out of the government administration.  
These functions were the hallmark duties of KGB officers in the “active reserve” during the 
Soviet era.75  The active reserve was what KGB officers became once they “left” the KGB 
service.  These officers were of the “nearly uncountable and possibly uncounted numbers of 
KGB officers planted throughout the civilian institutions of the USSR”.76  While executing their 
civilian duties, they held specific functions within their jobs of interest of the KGB and drew a 
salary from the organization as well.77 
 Following Anatoly Sobchak’s failure to gain reelection, the Putin’s moved to Moscow, 
where Vladimir took over as the Deputy Head of Presidential Property Management.  Again, the 
details of which made it appear as another active reserve style posting – the position held little 
public responsibility but granted Putin a great deal of access to elements of the government.78  
Within two years, Putin would be the Director of the FSB.79  Vladimir Putin was now running 
the successor organization to his beloved KGB which had likely provided him with multiple 
opportunities for advancement thus far in his life. 
 Then, on August 7th 1999, an Islamic terrorist leader Ibn al-Khattab and a Chechnyan 
warlord Shamil Basayev launched a 1500 person assault on Dagestan in the Caucus region.80  
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They sought the establishment of a Caliphate in the region.  In September of the same year, four 
bombings claimed the lives of 300 Russians in Moscow and Volgodonsk, in the northern 
Caucuses.81  Naturally, the intelligence pointed to Chechen terrorists being responsible for these 
bombings, and gave Putin, now Prime Minister, all the cause necessary to use military force in 
the region.82 
In an eerie twist of history, a fifth bombing was adverted and the plotting terrorists 
captured.  However, three points of confusion lend credibility to the bombings being 
manufactured by the FSB to justify the use of military force.  First, the terrorist turned out to be 
FSB agents, acting undercover.  The FSB claimed, after the identity of their agents was 
discovered, that their agents were conducting an “exercise” and that the bags of explosives were 
nothing more than sugar.  The local FSB knew nothing and officially reported surprise by the 
announcement from Moscow.83  Second, three days prior to the bombing in Volgodonsk, a 
member of the Duma announced to parliament that he had just received the report of the 
bombing in the Caucuses.  On that day, a bombing had occurred in Moscow, not the Caucuses.84  
Finally, the sad fates of all who have investigated the bombings resembles a silencing campaign 
akin to Soviet KGB methods.  Of the independent committee commissioned to investigate, two 
were murdered and the third was killed in a car accident.  The committee’s lawyer was arrested 
under illegal arms possession charges. 85  The journalist Anna Politkovskaya was shot four times 
at point-blank range86 and former KGB agent Alexander Litvinenko was poisoned by radioactive 
polonium in 2006.87  These dark details point to the validity of the FSB, an agency which 
Vladimir Putin himself directed until a month prior to the bombings, having an orchestrating role 
in the framing of the conflict. 
Finally, Putin celebrated “Cheka Day” on December 20th, 1999 which honored the state’s 
first security service.  He did so by restoring the picture of Yuri Andropov, the head of the KGB 
when Putin joined, to the wall of the FSB building.  Later, at a gala, he was quoted as saying “I 
want to report that a group of FSB operatives, sent to work undercover in the government, is 
successfully carrying out the first stage of its mission.”88 
 The evidence pointing to the KGB planting Vladimir Putin in highly convenient positions 
for not only the organization’s gain but also Putin’s is quite believable.  At least twice it appears 
that Putin was given significant opportunities via positions of the active reserve, promoting a 
KGB plan to advance him early in his career.   Additionally, the evidence of the FSB plotting to 
shape events within the Russian Federation to possibly include the rise of Putin is quite 
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believable.  Putin himself was running the FSB by July 1998 and the conflict in Chechnya 
(which may have been shaped by FSB actions) assisted greatly in his rise to Prime Minister, and 
ultimately President.  Granted, one could easily dismiss much of this as conspiracy theory, but 
one must recall Putin’s unabashed belief in the KGB as a boy, and the words that Bakatin once 
said “[The KGB] seemed to be created especially for organizing conspiracies and coups”.89 
 
The Loyalty and Luck Theory 
 
 From an early age, Vladimir Putin believed that loyalty should be a core character trait.  
His rise to the presidency is littered with examples of either times where Putin showed loyalty to 
others and times where others showed loyalty to him (or repaid loyalty once given to them).  In 
his biography, Putin recalls his days in high school and with his Sambo (a Soviet combination of 
Judo and wrestling) club, Trud Athletic Club.90  During his bid to get into Leningrad University, 
his coaches attempted to persuade him to instead focus on his Sambo, which would lead to 
acceptance into an institution designed around more military careers such as the Academy of 
Civil Aviation or even the Army.91  When Putin refused, his heart set on KGB service, and 
therefore law studies, his coaches tried to coerce him.  They claimed to have helped him get into 
university and asked that he repay the favor by switching to another Sambo club.  Putin learned 
that this was a ruse, and stayed with the Trud Club, saying “all my friends were there, and my 
first coach.  I said I would never join another club.  I would play for the one I wanted.”92  
Additionally, it is difficult to say that anyone can make a career of anything with success without 
a measure of luck.  However, Vladimir Putin’s career is often marked with strokes of meeting the 
right person or being noticed at the right time.  His accounts of these events lead to a rather lucky 
set of breaks for Putin at some rather critical times in his career. 
 Putin’s belief in loyalty undoubtedly manifested when he was young; however, the full 
resolve of its importance to him culminated at the end of his KGB posting in Dresden.  In 1989, 
Germans stormed the Ministry of Security (MGB) building in Dresden, Putin recalled that the 
military contingent for the USSR stated “we cannot do anything without orders from Moscow. 
And Moscow is silent.”93  Putin explains this gave him the feeling that “the country no longer 
existed.  That it had disappeared.  It was clear that the Union was ailing. And it had a terminal 
disease without a cure – a paralysis of power.”94  This event, in Putin’s eyes, was likely seen as 
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betrayal of loyalty.  Loyalty which had been dutifully maintained by the KGB within Dresden, 
and loyalty which was not reciprocated by the Union. 
 Putin’s truest examples of loyalty came in the form of personal relationships.  First, with 
his to Anatoly Sobchak.  During the coup attempt by the State Committee for the State of 
Emergency in the USSR (GKChP SSSR) in August of 1991, Putin remained devotedly by the 
side of Sobchak.95  In his personal account, they set out to visit the people, specifically the 
factories and plants, like the Kirov Factory.96  However, a different form of Putin’s loyalty is 
painted by Masha Gessen, “this is mostly a lie: many independent eyewitnesses describe 
Sobchak, and Putin with him, going into hiding in the bunker at the Kirov industrial plant.”97  
Even more interestingly, Putin says that the coup was “destroying the country”.98  Which 
motivated him to send his second resignation letter to the KGB (his first, sent to avoid blackmail 
while Deputy Mayor was “blocked” almost a year earlier99).  Showing his loyalty to Sobchak, 
Putin said “I was no longer a KGB officer.  As soon as the coup began, I immediately decided 
whose side I was on. I knew for sure that I would never follow the coup-plotter’s orders.  I would 
never be on their side.”100 
 Later, Putin received some return on his loyalty investment.  During his time in 
Sobchak’s administration, Putin oversaw a barter system for food to be delivered to St. 
Petersburg in exchange for oil, timber, metals, cotton, and other natural resources granted to it by 
the Russian state.101  For the $92 million in exports and $34 million in commissions to the 
companies which were to execute the foreign trade on behalf of St. Petersburg, none of the 
imported food made it into St. Petersburg.102  A councilwoman of St. Petersburg, Marina Salye, 
investigated and found that these numbers only accounted for roughly 10% of the authorized 
export which Moscow had granted Sobchak’s administration.  She supplied her report, citing the 
kickback scheme and all to the city council, who referred it to Sobchak’s office, who promptly 
killed any action.103  Still, Salye wrote Yeltsin’s office with the same information, gaining the 
eye of the Chief Comptroller, whose report on the matter to Yeltsin was effectively ignored and 
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nothing ever came of any of it.104  Putin was the point man during this time for roughly a billion 
dollar kickback scheme and when his actions were called into question, it appears that those 
whom Putin had been loyally making rich, loyally defended their executioner. 
 The final act of loyalty to Anatoly Sobchak came after he lost reelection and was living 
under constant threat of prosecution.  When St. Petersburg prosecutors finally caught up with 
Anatoly Sobchak, he collapsed in the briefing room and was rushed to the hospital, where he was 
diagnosed with a heart attack.  He was then transferred to the care of a close Putin-family friend, 
Yuri Shevchecnko, and over the November 7th holiday weekend, he was quietly smuggled out of 
the country to Paris, where he would undergo a surgery.  However, the receiving hospital, when 
questioned by Russian correspondents, had no record of any such patient.105  As his biography 
describes it, the entire event appeared to be a “special operation organized by a professional”.  
Putin’s remarks to this were; “What are you talking about?  There was nothing special about it. 
The newspapers wrote that he was whisked out, without even going through customs.  That’s not 
true, he passed through customs and passport control at the border.  Everything was as it was 
supposed to be.  They put stamps in his passport.  They put him on the airplane.  That was 
that.”106  The facts lend themselves to a grateful and loyal Putin, now with the connections 
afforded him by his Moscow active reserve posting, providing safe haven to his former boss. 
 Putin’s loyalty obviously didn’t end with Anatoly Sobchak.  During his time in the 
presidential administration, Putin found a group of allies to whom his loyalty would prove 
invaluable.  Yeltsin’s inner circle was known as The Family – it was comprised of Tatianna 
Yeltsin (Boris’ daughter), Valentin Yumashev (Yeltsin’s former Chief of Staff and Tatianna’s 
future husband), Alexander Voloshin (Yeltsin’s Chief of Staff), and Boris Berezovsky (a 
business tycoon who owned 49% of and controlled ORT, the state television channel).  The 
Family, from the 1996 reelection of Yeltsin had been impressed by Putin’s loyalty and planned 
to move him through the Prime Minister position into the presidency as Yeltsin’s successor.107  
As the Director of the FSB, Vladimir Putin stymied or squashed multiple criminal investigations 
into The Family and other high level Kremlin officials, including Pavel Borodin.108  When asked 
by his biographers how he made his move from St. Petersburg to Moscow and who had made 
him the job offer, Putin replied “Borodin, as odd as it may seem.  Chief of Staff Pavel Borodin 
brought me into the presidential administration.”109  Again, Vladimir Putin was loyally 
protecting those who had loyally given him a chance or protected him earlier. 
 Putin’s loyalty repayments from The Family didn’t end with his tenure in the FSB.   
During the presidential election in December 1999, Vladimir Putin was a relatively unknown 
actor.  He had been Prime Minister for only a few months and only really known for leading the 
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actions against terrorism in Chechnya.  He was facing off against Yevgeny Primakov, the former 
director of the SVR and a former Prime Minister to Boris Yeltsin.  Primakov had joined with 
Yuri Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow to form a powerful new party championed by the ideal of 
anti-corruption in the Yeltsin administration.110  The Family formed a new political party, 
Yedinstvo (“unity” in English) around Putin.  The party had no historic roots, no independent 
philosophy, and practically no policy objectives, but it did have two things – unabashed support 
for Vladimir Putin and unabashed support from Berezovsky’s ORT television channel and 
newspaper outlets.111  ORT ran a smear campaign against Primakov and Luzhkov, citing their 
old age, frailness, and Luzhkov’s alleged corruption, while glorifying Putin as a hero for his 
actions in Chechnya.112  For this brazen support, President Vladimir Putin’s first act as president 
of the Russian Federation was to grant immunity to his predecessor – Boris Yeltsin.113 
 Regarding Vladimir Putin’s luck, the two prime examples come from Anatoly Sobchak 
and Pavel Borodin.  Again, Sobchak brought Putin into the St. Petersburg government at a time 
when he was unsure of his future.  Following his tour in Dresden, Putin said of his future “I 
wanted to write my doctoral dissertation, check out the university, and perhaps get a job 
there.”114  He mentions that a friend of his, who had remained on the staff of the university after 
completing his doctorate, asked if Putin would be willing to go to work for Anatoly Sobchak.115  
Why Putin?  Why not another, more accomplished doctoral candidate or bright graduating 
student?  As Putin says himself, “back when I was a student, I didn’t have any personal 
connections to him.”116 
 When Putin made the leap from St. Petersburg to the presidential administration in 
Moscow, it was Paval Borodin who initiated the action.  This again appears to be a stroke of 
good luck for a forty-four year old former KGB officer.  As discussed above, Putin phrased his 
response to who gave him the job offer in Moscow with an “as odd as it may seem” ending.  
Denoting that he was amazed by this turn as much as anyone.  He continued in his biography 
saying, “Chief of Staff Pavel Borodin brought me into the presidential administration.  I don’t 
know why.  We had met several times.  That was essentially the extent of our relationship.”117  
The track record from this meeting to the presidency of the Russian Federation would be a short 
three and a half year journey. 
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 As the analysis shows, both the KGB Plant / FSB Plot Theory and the Loyalty and Luck 
Theory have significant data to prove their worth.  Unfortunately, as with many historical events, 
it is difficult to say with certainty that either stands alone as either the correct theory or the better 
of two theories.  The conclusion drawn here is that both theories have truth in reality and explain 
Vladimir Putin’s assent to the Presidency of the Russian Federation. 
 The KGB Plant / FSB Plot Theory has its greatest weight early in Putin’s bureaucratic 
career.  The fact that Putin was so quickly hired by Sobchak, his job description akin to KGB 
active reserve postings, his submission of two separate resignation letters almost a year apart 
from each other, his job description in the Presidential Property Management Office also akin to 
an active reserve posting, and his posting to the head of the state intelligence service without 
“any” intelligence work for over seven years and only the lowly rank of Lieutenant Colonel upon 
resignation all point to the fact that his career path was carefully coordinated by an entity which 
had “its own people inside all essential organizations”118 as Bakatin once described the KGB.  
Albeit, it is more difficult to suppose that the same organization was still pulling strings and 
crafting Putin’s career once he was moved into the Prime Minister’s position.  At that point it 
appears that Putin himself had taken over the control of the planting and plotting, as best 
illustrated by the bombings (possibly all covertly organized by the FSB) which legitimized the 
military action in Chechnya. 
 Loyalty and luck speak volumes in Putin’s past.  It’s undeniable that his loyalty to 
Sobchak was both because of and in return for the protection Sobchak provided him in the 
natural resources kickback scheme.  Putin’s loyalty really took center stage in his rise during his 
time in the FSB, as Prime Minister, and once he had secured the presidency.  The protection he 
provided to The Family and the efforts they made to ensure his presidency were truly faithful 
acts amongst a group of compatriots of power and control.  Whether through a series of planted 
opportunities, or a long-term investment strategy in loyalty, Vladimir Putin truly made the most 
of each position he held.  He seems to have fulfilled his early belief as he told his biographers, 
“A single intelligence officer could rule over the fates of thousands of people.  At least, that’s 
how I saw it.”119 
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Annex C - What was the United States and NATO Strategic Focus from 2000-2010? 
 
 The first decade of the twentieth century was a rapidly evolving and dynamic time for the 
international security environment.  It came in on the heels of the 1990s, where the west had 
reshaped their security focus from a Cold War, anti-USSR posture to a smaller-scale, regionally 
focused posture.  In the 1990s, the US and NATO had carried out intra-European military 
operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as many NATO allies joined the coalition with the US 
to counter Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in the Middle East.  Russia had spent the decade 
attempting recovery from their abandonment of Communism and adoption of capitalism, Boris 
Yeltsin had scaled back the Russian military’s operations by 90% of their 1989 levels, choosing 
instead to focus on internal security.120 
 Without its founding principle threat of the USSR, NATO was left to find new purpose 
and reinvent itself.  Having spent the 1990s doing so, NATO issued an update to their Strategic 
Concept, akin to the US’ National Defense Strategy, in 1999 to forecast the period from 2000-
2010.  The US, too, was seeking to establish it new direction in the wake of the Cold War and 
during the 1990s began to explore the future of its military.  Seeing a future where the US 
military would be relatively unrivaled, it appeared as reduction of operations to favor cost saving 
measures to the American tax payer were set to come. 
 However, after 9/11, the security situation of the west rapidly changed.  The fight against 
global terrorism enacted a NATO article V declaration, and began the western militaries shift of 
focus.  Amid the “long battle” against terrorism, the US and NATO watched as the Russian 
Federation began their invasion of Georgia in 2008.  While not deemed a revisionist or territorial 
land-grab by Russia, and therefore not drawing an international line between opponents, it was 
Russian military force being used in a conventional, not counter-terrorism (CT) manner. 
 What would have been in the mind of the US and NATO leaders as they watched this 
decade unfold?  Starting with thoughts of retrenchment and enjoying a peace dividend, quickly 
shifting to protracted, expeditionary, low-intensity conflict, and then seeing the military might of 
a resurgent Russian Federation used outside of the Federation’s boarders.  What would be the 
driving strategic thought which captured all these different events and led the US and NATO 
through them?  The strategy of the US and NATO is laid out in their strategic documents, which 
paint a picture of the evolving direction and challenges facing both.  Therefore, this annex is 
more of a historic narrative than a comparative analysis; however, with a hypothesis.  This 
narrative will seek to show that a theory of Fight the Fight in Front of You emerged as the 
overarching policy and that due the rapidly changing events, the strategy driving the US and 
NATO was having to evolve as fast as the circumstances around it. 
 
The Forecast of the New Millennium 
 
  The new millennium brought new changes to the strategic focus of the US and NATO, 
some known and some yet to be known.  In a 1999, scholars wrote about “averting the train 
wreck” in the new millennium.  There point mostly rode on the disparity between the 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 1997 and the Clinton Administration’s defense spending 
budget proposal.  The QDR of 1997 had multiple key components to it.  First, it retained the 
Army’s ten division structure, maintained the Navy’s twelve carrier battle groups (now known as 
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carrier strike groups), reduced the Air Force’s size by approximately 27,000 active duty 
personnel, renewed the Marine Corps three Marine Expeditionary Force structure, and drew a 
total US military end strength at 1,360,000 active duty personnel, 835,000 reservists, and 
640,000 civilian personnel.121  Second, it focused on maintaining a “high priority” on the 
development of a National Missile Defense (NMD) program.122  A program which would not be 
fully realizable until the US’s departure from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002.123  
Finally, it makes note of the requirement to maintain the strategic forces at current levels and 
ensure uninterrupted modernization across the force.124  Keeping in mind that the QDR is a 
report generated by the Department of Defense to highlight the requirements of the future and 
provide the administration the tools to make proper budgetary proposals.  The Clinton 
Administration proposed a defense spending bill for FY 2002 of $275,000,000,000 ($275B), 
which would account for 2.8% of GDP, and a required active duty end strength of 1,370,000 
personnel.125 
 The disparity here is in achieving the size and modernization required by the QDR while 
remaining within budget.  Once the funding for the required 1.37M personnel was accounted for 
and other discretionary requirements removed, only enough money remains to properly 
modernize 44% of the QDR dictated force structure.126  “Unless assigned equipment could 
continue to operate beyond its projected service life, in both physical and economic terms, the 
military services eventually would see their force levels fall by as much as 56 percent as military 
equipment reached the end of useful service life and would be retired.”127 
 This was the “push versus pull”, requirements versus funding debate going into the 
twenty-first century.  This type of military reduction is common as a “peace dividend”, or the 
return of funding from defense spending to other areas following the conclusion of conflict.  
Unfortunately, this peace dividend would be short lived, as the US was entering another period 
of conflict soon after the turn of the century. 
 NATO too at this time was seeking to refine itself through the publication of a new 
Strategic Concept in 1999.  This new vision centered on four major points.  First, NATO was 
seeking to restructure itself in a more expeditionary manner.  The view was that NATO’s 
challenges now likely resided outside of the boarders of Europe and that “opposing forces are 
likely to be configured very differently from the massed armour of the defunct Warsaw Pact.”128  
Moreover, most European NATO members’ armed services were structured to fight on their own 
territory, or that of a neighboring ally.  They had, and, in most cases, still have, very little 
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capacity to project power over long distances.”129  NATO began to form structures like that of 
the US armed services, under the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) model, capable of 
undertaking more rapid, flexible, and longer-range operations.130 
 Second, NATO recognized terrorism as a significant problem, but was torn on it 
implications for the alliance.  Many of the European states felt at the time they were not as 
affected by terrorism because, unlike the US, they didn’t maintain an alliance with Israel nor 
stationed nearly the same number, if any, troops in the Middle East.  Additionally, most states 
felt that since they already maintained intelligence sharing arrangements with one another, they 
were in the correct posture for combatting this threat.131 
 Third, NATO felt as though it had a significant role to play in countering weapons of 
mass destruction (WMDs).  This theme, whether discussed as anti-WMD, counter-WMD, anti-
WMD proliferation, would persist through the strategic documents of both NATO and the US 
through the entire decade.  Obviously, the shear terrible totality of the use of a WMD makes the 
strategic importance of the mission to control them a persistent one.  Interestingly, NATO was 
conflicted as to how they would play a role in anti-WMD strategy.  “Most European states have 
been less than enthusiastic than the US about the ‘containment’ of Iran.  As for North Korea, this 
is regarded as a purely US and East Asia issue.”132 
 Forth and finally, NATO took a strategic stance on their role regarding the United 
Nations (UN).  It was NATO’s belief that they were authorized to act in accordance with 
international law, without UN approval, on behalf of a state which had been attacked, 
exemplified by Kuwait in 1990.  However, the concept of unilateral NATO action was not the 
modis operandi of choice for many NATO allies.  “UN approval should be sought whenever 
possible,” despite their own admission that “on occasion, Russia and China’s vetoes on the UN 
Security Council will make it impossible to seek prior approval for essential NATO action.”133 
 This is where the US and NATO strategically stood on the eve of 9/11.  “Most of the 
politicians and electorates do not feel under any strong security threat”134  The feeling of security 
and revision of strategic policy pointed toward a decade of “peace dividends” and likely military 
draw downs. 
 
After the Turn of the Century 
 
The 2001 QDR was published just nineteen days following the September 11th attacks on 
the US.  Obviously, this meant that this document was developed to provide a strategy of the 
future where the US had not been attacked on its own soil, especially since the research for the 
document was completed by December of 2000.  The QDR specifically listed eight features of 
future conflict that the US military must be prepared for.  Regional conflict, regional competitor 
attacking at the homeland, Anti-access / Area denial (A2AD) tactics and systems, WMDs as part 
of A2AD tactics and systems, involvement in failed states, operations in urban and “chaotic” 
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environments, continued diffusion of military technology, and high levels of information 
warfare.135 
Additionally, the QDR focused on Russia and higher-end threats than terrorism.  During 
an in depth analysis, the QDR refers to Russia as “the most demanding future threat” to the US.  
Due to its ability to sustain production of defense material, its already significant quantities of 
defense equipment, and its access to a large pool of trained personnel.136  The QDR highlights 
this combining its first two features of future conflict into a single thought and the capability of 
Russia to challenge the US.  The QDR admits that several powers, taking specific note of the 
Russian Federation, have the ability to shortly challenge the US as strong regional actors.137  
Although it seems to temper its analysis of Russia when discussing the temporal aspects of 
threats to the US.  “There seems to be agreement among many that a dissatisfied state could 
eventually build intensely into a near-peer to the United States sometime after 2025.”138  This is 
a document riddled with Cold War assumptions.  The fact that it concludes the Russian 
Federation could quickly produce and manufacture itself into a strong regional competitor, but 
then dismisses this fact, shows that it is looking at the security situation in terms of bipolarity 
versus unipolarity.  The concept that a state would have to build “intensely” to achieve near-peer 
status by 2025 assumes a state attempting to rival the US’ global reach and underplays the 
strategic advantage of a rival focusing their build-up in a single region. 
The 2001 National Security Strategy (NSS), also produced before the attacks of 
September 11th, highlight’s the Russian Federations challenge to US interests and the 
international community as well.  While discussing the incidence in Chechnya (please see Annex 
B for a more detailed account of Chechnya in the early 2000s), it says, “Chechnya is a major 
problem in Russia’s post-Communist development and relationship with the international 
community; the means Russia is using in Chechnya are undermining its legitimate objective of 
upholding its territorial integrity and protecting citizens from terrorism and lawlessness.”139  As 
well, the NSS states the importance of the Russian Federation to the international community.  
As the newly independent states (NIS) formed after the fall of the Soviet Union, they sought to 
find their way in the international system and the NSS points out that even as of 2000, their 
efforts depend on the “largest and most power – Russia.”140 
After this point, the strategic documents published by the US and NATO had almost a 
singular theme – combatting terrorism.  Many security issues of the first few years of the century 
and of the last century persisted through the time of the GWOT; however, the shift in strategic 
mentality that the current “enemy” or the “fight in front of us” was global terrorism. 
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The events of September 11th, 2001 vaulted the US and NATO, under an article V 
declaration, into the GWOT.  Specifically, the US and NATO targeted the terrorist network al 
Qaeda, and its safe haven of Afghanistan, to eradicate the threat posed by this extremist group.  
The military operations in Afghanistan forced the US and NATO to rethink their tactics and 
strategy.  There was not a conventional force opposing the NATO regular forces, and the 
fighting created space for rapid innovation in the NATO strategy regarding asymmetric warfare, 
urban conflict, and counter insurgency operations. 
The Bush administration published its 2002 NSS following the attacks, and much of it is 
focused specifically at defeating terrorism and defending the homeland.  Notably, the first two 
points of intent in the President’s introduction are to “champion aspirations for human dignity” 
and to “strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and 
our friends”.141  The former is a guiding headline under which oppressive regimes, such as the 
Taliban, were targeted during the GWOT.  The latter is a clear reference to NATO and the 
functions the US was happy it was supplying in the GWOT.  In the section discussing human 
dignity, the Strategy says, “No people on earth yearn to be oppressed, aspire to servitude, or 
eagerly await the midnight knock of the secret police.”142  The section goes even further, citing 
that the US will “press governments” and “take special efforts” regarding democratic 
development and promotion of freedom.143  These words show that the resolve against anti-
democratic states was of the highest priority for the Bush administration in 2002 and that the 
administration vaguely framed their response so as not to remove any possible courses of action. 
The discussion of defeating global terrorism is more direct and explicit.  “The enemy is 
terrorism – premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.”144  It 
expands the details of this enemy and the fight which will meet it saying, “the struggle against 
global terrorism is different from any other war in our history.  It will be fought on many fronts 
against a particularly elusive enemy over an extended period of time.  Progress will come 
through the persistent accumulation of successes – some seen, some unseen.”145  The US laid out 
in this strategy an expectation for the military road ahead.  The fight will be global therefore not 
just in Afghanistan, the fight will be protracted and last for some time, and the fight will be 
sometimes secretive and may not lend itself to public viewership. 
The NSS did mention the Russian Federation, a state which was rapidly centralizing 
power and shifting away from democracy under Putin’s leadership at this time.  “Russia is in the 
midst of a hopeful transition, reaching for its democratic future and a partner in the war on 
terror.”146  Additionally, it says that we have “moved from confrontation to cooperation as the 
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hallmark of our relationship with Russia”147, and that “the United States and Russia are no longer 
strategic adversaries.”148  The NSS paints a picture of two states who are quickly becoming 
allies, through the common enemy of terrorism.  This rhetoric supports the idea of fighting the 
fight in front of you, regardless of what the internal situation was within the Russian Federation, 
at this time they were assisting in the most pressing issue for the US, the GWOT.  In a short and 
intriguing paragraph, the NSS does recognize the still pending challenges to the US-Russian 
relationship.  “Lingering distrust of our motives and policies by key Russian elites slows 
improvement in our relations.  Russia’s uneven commitment to the basic values of free-market 
democracy and dubious record in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
remain matters of great concern.”149 
While not necessarily a strategic document, President Bush’s address to the graduating 
class of 2002 from the United States Military Academy in West Point, NY serves as a strategic 
communication regarding the changing security environment and the US’ future intentions.  The 
president made a few key points pertaining to the GWOT which likely had different 
interpretations in Moscow.  President Bush discussed how containment and deterrence, the 
hallmark strategies of the previous seventy years (and obviously opposition tactics to the Soviet 
Union and Communism), no longer held applicability in a world of terrorism.150  Granted, most 
security scholars would agree with this, whether based in Washington or Moscow; however, the 
president quickly followed with, “We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the 
best.  We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation 
treaties, and then systematically break them.  If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will 
have waited too long.”151  The concept that “tyrants who break non-proliferation treaties” are not 
to have the faith of the US was likely pointed in the direction of North Korea and Iran, two states 
President Bush would brand as part of the “Axis of Evil”; however, in Russia one could not help 
but seem the similarity to the President’s NSS.  Russia has a “dubious record” in preventing 
WMD proliferation according to the NSS, and the President stated that he has no faith in the 
“tyrants” who act as such.  Likely, Putin inferred that he was one of these tyrants. 
Secondly, President Bush said that “if we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will 
have waited too long.”152  Again, a statement which while highly debatable among security 
scholars, had its place in the security strategy of the Bush administration regarding terrorism and 
the GWOT.  However, the view from Moscow could have been completely different.  It is easy 
to see that this statement, paired so closely to the discussion of “tyrants” may have included the 
Russian Federation as a possible target of US preemptive force. 
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NATO at the same time was looking to update its strategy and create the foundations of 
an alliance which possessed the necessary capabilities to fight global terror.  In 2002, NATO 
issued the Prague Communique, creating two institutions with that specific aim.  First, it 
established the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (NATO SACT) to create 
strategy and doctrine without the burden of simultaneous operational responsibilities of NATO 
forces.  According to NATO, the four principle functions of SACT are strategic thinking, 
development of capabilities, education, training, and exercises, and cooperation and 
engagement.153  Second, NATO introduced the Rapid Response Force (RRF).  The design behind 
this force is that NATO will have a standing, ready force to react rather than NATO being forced 
to draw together, train, and deploy a multinational force after crisis has occurred.  NATO’s 
purpose for the RRF is to be “able to provide a rapid military response to an emerging crisis, 
whether for collective defence purposes or for other crisis-response operations.  The [RRF] gives 
the Alliance the means to respond swiftly to various types of crises anywhere in the world.  It is 
also a driving engine for NATO’s military transformation.”154 
  
The Intra-GWOT Period 
 
From 2003-2010, the US and NATO were engrossed in military conflict in the Middle 
East and with the eradication of global terrorism that threatened the west.  Notably, during this 
same time the Russian Federation was completing its power consolidation, began making its 
warnings to the west that it may feel inclined to use said power, and even executed military 
operations in its neighbor Georgia.  For a more detailed analysis of the Russian Federation’s 
2000-2010 history, please see Annex D. 
Numerous strategic documents were produced in this period including the 2004 National 
Military Strategy (NMS), 2004 NATO Istanbul Communique, 2005 National Defense Strategy 
(NDS), 2006 QDR, 2006 NSS, and the 2006 NATO Riga Communique.  Unsurprisingly, all 
these documents outlined a very clear strategic focus of the US and NATO – global terrorism.  
The interesting analysis of these documents shows what is not discussed as a part of the US and 
NATO’s strategic focus.  Some documents, such as the 2004 NMS and the NATO Istanbul 
Communique had no direct references to the Russian Federation while others reference the 
Russian Federation with regard to CT or anti-WMD proliferation.  Along the historic trail from 
2003-2010, some increasing thoughts on the changes occurring within the Federation and on the 
Federation’s actions in Georgia began to emerge. 
The 2006 QDR states that “Russia remains a country in transition.  It is unlikely to pose a 
military threat to the United States or its allies on the same scale or intensity as the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War.”155  Like the 2001 QDR before it, this statement is down-playing the 
regional threat posed by the Russian military build-up and glossing it over by pointing out that 
the Russian Federation will not return to the global reach of capabilities that the Soviet Union 
had.  Following the presidential election in Ukraine (for a more detailed account please see 
Annex D), the 2005 NSS had slightly stronger words for the Russian Federation.  “Recent trends 
regrettably point toward a diminishing commitment to democratic freedoms and institutions.  We 
will work to try to persuade the Russian Government to more forward, not backward, along 
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freedom’s path.”156  Further, the NSS alludes to the suspected election tampering in Ukraine by 
the Russian government, “efforts to prevent democratic developments at home and abroad will 
hamper the development of Russia’s relations with the United States, Europe, and its 
neighbors.”157 
 It was at this time that the Russian Federation began issuing warnings to the west about 
what it considered its sphere of influence.  First, to the combined Federal Assembly in 2006 and 
then to the Munich Conference on Security Policy in 2007, Putin outlined that the Russian 
Federation did not believe in the world as a unipolar system, and especially not in an 
international order where the legitimacy of the UN could be substituted by the EU or NATO.158  
Then, after eight years of consolidating power in Russia, Putin launched the 2008 war in 
Georgia.  Assumingly, the US and NATO would take notice of this action and recognize the 
regional power and threat that the now centralized Russian Federation was.  However, the 2010 
QDR focuses (again) mostly on CT, the securing of cyberspace, and the non-proliferation of 
WMDs as its themes.159  Only the 2010 NSS takes a stab at identifying the Russian Federation as 
a revisionist power and threat to European security.  “We seek to build a stable, substantive, 
multidimensional relationship with Russia, based on mutual interests. The United States has an 
interest in a strong, peaceful, and prosperous Russia that respects international norms. As the two 
nations possessing the majority of the world's nuclear weapons, we are working together to 
advance nonproliferation, both by reducing our nuclear arsenals and by cooperating to ensure 
that other countries meet their international commitments to reducing the spread of nuclear 
weapons around the world. We will seek greater partnership with Russia in confronting violent 
extremism, especially in Afghanistan. We also will seek new trade and investment arrangements 
for increasing the prosperity of our peoples. We support efforts within Russia to promote the rule 
of law, accountable government, and universal values. While actively seeking Russia's 
cooperation to act as a responsible partner in Europe and Asia, we will support the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of Russia's neighbors.”160  This is the entirety of the statement given to 
Russia as a “21st century center of influence”.  As is common throughout the 2000-2010 period, 
it opens on the control of WMDs and recognizes that Russia’s substantial strategic weapons 
cache makes it a critical partner in this venture.  Then, again the common theme through the 
“intra-GWOT” period, it discusses the common interest of CT operations.  Finally, it closes with 
a statement – “we will support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia’s neighbors”.161  
Not a threat or a strong assurance to said neighbors, but finally, after ten years of centralization 
of power and increasing threat to Europe, the US recognizes that Russia may actually be an actor 
which can destabilize Europe. 
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 From 2000-2010, the US and NATO saw a changing security environment, one marred 
with asymmetric threats and unprecedented challenges.  Global terrorism struck the very heart of 
the west early in the decade and occupied its focus for the remainder.  Undoubtedly, the efforts 
to rid the world of terrorism and the safe havens which sponsor or harbor terrorists was not just 
noble, but a necessary action for world security.  However, this time proved that crises and 
reactionary tactics rarely fit within the structures of calculated strategies. 
 From the beginning of the century, the US and NATO were focused on scaling back their 
militaries, either in size of by operations, in order to reap the rewards of a stable peace.  At this 
time, the US noted that the Russian Federation was its “most demanding future threat”162, yet it 
would quickly back from that position following 9/11 despite the increasing authoritarianism and 
resurging military within the Federation. However, with that peace shattered, the restructuring of 
forces capable to combat a terrorist threat and strategizing of how to employ those forces to 
combat said threat became the principle work in the west. 
 The Russian Federation, with its own history of combatting terrorism in the Caucuses, 
found common ground with the west in its conflict with global terrorism.  However, during this 
time the Russian Federation continued to centralize and reconstitute its armed forces.  As the 
west created new strategies for countering terrorism, they took steps, including unilateral actions, 
which they felt were in the best interests of winning the fight against global terrorism.  The 
Russian Federation disagreed and a Thucydides Trap between the east and west was born.  
President Putin, while supporting the flow of US military equipment into Afghanistan in 2007, 
said that unilateralism “stimulates an arms race.”163 
 From the strategic documents of the United States and NATO, the overarching strategy 
from 2000-2010 was to fight the fight in front of them, which of course was terrorism.  
Unfortunately, this meant making compromises in other areas, such as in the west’s evaluation of 
Vladimir Putin’s consolidation of power in the Russian Federation, and the actions the Russian 
Federation proved it was willing to take inside its perceived sphere of influence.  The first 
decade of the twenty-first century showed that a strategic focus on terrorism, while appeasing the 
deterioration of democracy and buildup of conventional power in the Russian Federation, lead to 
another rapid shift in strategy – one that would recognize the return of great power competition. 
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Annex D - Why is Putin Able to Wield Such Significant Power? 
 
 The Russian Federation under Boris Yeltsin saw corruption, violence, and even the 
president-loyal army shell the house of the Russian parliament.  Yeltsin’s tenure did show that he 
wielded significant power within the Federation; however, it also showed that Yeltsin lacked 
either enough political power or influence to prevent their occurrence in the first place.  
Interestingly, Vladimir Putin has not had to deal with the same level of infighting and turmoil as 
his predecessor.  How has Putin managed to achieve this?  What power, influence, or control 
does Putin wield which Yeltsin did not?  Normally, a historical analysis would suggest two to 
three theories and seek to explore which is the most logically correct reason for an event’s or 
circumstance’s occurrence.  However, regarding Vladimir Putin’s ability to wield dramatic 
power and near complete state control as the president of the Russian Federation is more of a 
historic narrative than analysis.  He has accomplished his consolidation and build-up of power 
relatively in the open, through legislative means and domestic and foreign policies. 
 Along the narrative, an important turning point seems to arise.  At this point, Vladimir 
Putin shifts his efforts from consolidation of power to the projection of that power.  This shift 
occurs between 2004 and 2005, after the Ukrainian presidential election.  As such, this narrative 
is broken into two parts – 2000-2004 and 2005-2008. 
 
The Consolidation of Power in Putin’s First Term 
 
 As discussed in Annex B, Putin’s first act as president was to grant immunity to his 
predecessor, Boris Yeltsin,164 and the day following his party’s (Yedinstvo) victory in the Duma 
elections, Putin was quoted as saying “I want to report that a group of FSB operatives, sent to 
work undercover in the government, is successfully carrying out the first stage of its mission.”165  
Making good on his illusion to an FSB plot to assume control of the government, Putin’s next 
actions were the beginning of his consolidation of power. 
 In the first two months of his presidency, Vladimir Putin issued eleven decrees.  Six of 
them were military in nature and within a month of assuming the presidency, Putin’s Prime 
Minister announced that defense spending would be increased by 50%.166  Three of the most 
noteworthy decrees were the removal of limitations and restoration of Soviet Era practices.  First, 
he removed the “no-first-strike” policy from the use of nuclear weapons in the military 
doctrine.167  As startling as that may seem, it was likely issued so early on in his presidency in 
order to give the new and still relatively unknown bureaucrat more strength in foreign policy 
negotiations, especially regarding the US.  This would make sense given that the Russian 
president will not meet face to face with the US president to begin a personal relationship until 
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June 2001.168  Second, Putin restored the mandatory training exercises for the military reserves.  
The startling circumstance here is the within the Russian Federation, all able-bodied men are 
considered part of the reserves.  This practice was abandoned sometime in the late 1980s after 
the conclusion of the USSR’s operations in Afghanistan.169  Finally, the president decreed that 
military training, such as small arms use and maintenance, was to be reinstituted in public and 
private secondary schools.  This policy too was from the bygone Soviet era, abolished during 
Perestroika under Mikhail Gorbachev.170  Finally, while not a military decree, but power-
consolidating nonetheless, Putin authorized some forty-odd ministers and other government 
officials to classify documents as state secrets171, a direct violation of article 29 of the Russian 
Federation constitution, which states, “everyone shall have the right freely to seek, receive, 
transmit, produce, and disseminate information by any legal means.  The list of types of 
information, which constitute State secrets, shall be determine by federal law.”172  Putin, from 
early in his presidency, felt as though his decree was evidently as powerful as a majority vote in 
the Duma and Federal Council, the prescribed method by which federal law is passed in the 
Russian Federation. 
 President Putin then set out on a mission to centralize his control on the valuable large 
business resources of Russia, including media and the oil and gas industry.  Gazprom serves as 
the prime example of Putin’s move to centralize these industries.  During the 1990’s and early 
2000’s, Rem Vyakhirev and his family ran Gazprom and its subsidiaries as personal wealth 
generators.173  If left unchecked, the Vyakhirev family would have likely privatized the entire 
organization in an effort to fully realize the personal profit.  Seeing this massive business and its 
profits as a possible revenue source for political opposition in the future, Putin moved against 
Vyakhirev in May 2001. After a single meeting at the Kremlin, Alexey Miller was appointed as 
the new CEO of Gazprom.  Miller had been Putin’s subordinate in St. Petersburg in the 
Committee on International Relations – the organization through which Putin executed the 
natural resource kickback scheme as described in Annex B.174  Alexey Miller would go on the 
sanatize much of Gazprom’s leadership loyal to Vyakhirev and ensure the state, specifically 
Putin, would remain unchallenged by this corporation’s wealth.175 
However, natural resource industry was not the only target of Putin’s consolidation.  
Prior to Gazprom, Putin had Vladimir Gusinsky, a powerful media magnate, arrested and his 
NTV television channel sold and effectively turned over to the government.176  To achieve this, 
the Kremlin forced the Gusinsky to trade his stake in the company for his personal freedom.  
“Someone […] had leaked to the press a document Gusinsky had signed before leaving the 
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country. […] this was a classic organized-crime contract, formalizing the exchange of one’s 
business for one’s personal safety, and the state was party to it.”177 Most shockingly, Boris 
Berezovsky, the man who through the efforts of his ORT television channel had help ensure 
Putin’s rise to the presidency, was driven by these acts to remain outside Russia in exile.178  
Consolidation of these industries gave the Kremlin, and obviously Putin, unparalleled (in the 
Russian Federation’s history, but not necessarily the USSR’s) control over highly lucrative 
international trade and domestic information flows.  Referring to Annex B, recall that these two 
functions (foreign trade and information flow) were often the two associated with the KGB 
active reserve positions Putin held earlier in his career. 
President Putin then set out to consolidate his political power within government.  
Commonly referred to as “strengthening vertical power”, this was Putin creating a system which 
eerily resembled the KGB Vadim Bakatin once described as “an organization formed to control 
and suppress everything and anything. […] its own people inside all essential organizations, a 
monopoly on information, and many other things.”179  First, Putin abolished the elected status of 
the Federal Council in lieu of political appointees.  Each of Russia’s eighty-nine regions would 
have two appointed members, one by the governor and the other by the region’s legislature.180  
This could be seen as actually decentralizing power among the regions of the Federation; 
however, the second and third acts of “strengthening vertical power” crushed that thought 
immediately.  Putin placed two very powerful controls on each of the eighty-nine regions of the 
Federation.  First, he passed a bill authorizing the removal of a governor from his or her posting 
for the mere suspicion of wrongdoing, and without legal due process or a court ruling.  Next, the 
Kremlin directed that presidentially appointed envoys will be sent to oversee each of the seven 
large territories (each comprising about a dozen regions) to oversee the work of the regional 
governors.181 The pedigree of these appointed envoys was disturbing to democratic principles.  
“Only two of them were civilians and one of these very much appeared to have the biography of 
an undercover KGB agent.  Two were KGB officers from Leningrad, one was a police general, 
and two more were army generals who had commanded the troops in Chechnya.”182 
It was around this time that Putin received one of his first lasting lessons on the 
importance of a well-funded and ready military.  On August 12th, 2000, the Russian Northern 
Fleet was ordered to carry out an “assembly march”, essentially an underway exercise but by the 
nature of not being called such, had no requirements in law or regulation.183  One of the crew of 
the nuclear-powered “Oscar Class” submarine Kursk, assigned to the Northern Fleet, told his 
mother, six days before disaster, that “death is on board with us” – referring to the poor state of 
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repair the Kursk and her onboard ordnance.184  Presumably a torpedo explosion, some 
catastrophic accident sent Kursk to the bottom of the Barents Sea.185  The Russian Navy was 
unable to mount a successfully rescue operation and on the eighth day following the accident, the 
Russian government accepted Norweigan assistance.  After managing to dock with the bottomed 
submarine, the rescue crew found no survivors.186  Putin, returning from a vacation on the Black 
Sea, met with the families of the Sailors onboard Kursk.  According to his biographer, he spent 
two hours and forty minutes with them outlining the compensation packages and answering 
heated questions.187  When asked about the foreign diver assistance, why it took so long to accept 
the help, and whether Russia had these types of rescue divers organic to her fleet, Putin was 
recorded as furiously shouting “We don’t have crap in this country!”188  This event no doubt set 
in the president’s mind, though he had already promised to restore the military, a resolve to do so 
which previously may not have been present. 
By the end of 2001, President Putin had now centralized major Russian business, 
including major energy exporters and media outlets, placed his own people over the regional 
governors, begun the efforts to restore the military might of Russia, and replaced an elected 
legislative body with appointees from the very regions of which he now had “envoy-control”.  
The Duma, the lower house of Russian Parliament, was the last remaining holdout of his 
“vertical power”.  Putin didn’t have to wait long to find a reason to implement measures of 
control on this entity. 
In September of 2004, 300 armed men seized control of a school in Beslan, North 
Ossetia.  After a three-day standoff with Federal Officers, the government forces stormed the 
building.  In the resulting aftermath, over three hundred people, including children at the school, 
lay dead.189  Putin addressed his mourning nation with these words, “we have to act, we have to 
increase the effectiveness of the government in combating the entire complex of problems facing 
the country…I am convinced that the unity of the country is the main condition of success in the 
fight against terrorism.”190  The “entire complex of problems facing the country” clear states that 
ending terrorism is not the only goal of any actions President Putin is about to undertake. 
True to his vague words, President Putin instituted four new laws to control the political 
power of the Russian Federation.  First, governors and the mayor of Moscow would no longer be 
elected officials; instead they would be presidential appointees.  Second, he increased the 
scrutiny of the registration process by which political parties registered to be considered on 
ballots.  Additionally to re-registering, the required threshold of votes required to gain seats in 
parliament would be raised from 5% to 7%.  Third, Putin instituted a system of “proportional 
representation” in the Duma.  From now on, Russian citizens would vote for their desired 
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political party, not for a candidate to the Duma.  Once the total percentage of votes was 
calculated, and assuming the party received more than the required 7%, the party would name 
the representatives who would be filling their allotted percentage of seats in the Duma.  Finally, 
Putin created a new body, the Public Chamber (made up of presidential appointees), to review 
proposed legislation before it went to the Duma.191 
Putin had now succeeded in almost every facet of power consolidation in Russia.  By the 
nature of the presidency before his time in office, he had control of the Russian armed forces.  
He had assumed control of the largest businesses in Russia to include the highly lucrative natural 
resource exportation industry and the media outlets.  He had replaced the Federal Council with 
appointees from the regional governors; governors whom he now personally appointed.  He had 
made the development of political party rivals even more difficult.  He had removed the 
candidates from the Duma elections, therefore enforcing a party-affiliation as the defining 
characteristic of voting behavior.  Finally, he had seized control of the end-to-end legislative 
process by creating the Public Chamber (again, presidentially appointed) to review laws before 
they went before the Duma and by extension the Federal Council.  He had the military, the laws, 
the money, and the information – and soon he may find reason to use them. 
 
The Ukrainian Presidential Election of 2004 
 
 In Annex A, under Part II – 2004 Enlargement, the “Freedom Agenda” without 
Strategic Consideration and/or Understanding Theory, the Ukrainian presidential election of 
2004 is briefly described.  It was widely held that the Russian Federation was tempering in the 
Ukrainian presidential election in favor of the Russian-leaning candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, 
including a possible poisoning attempt on the US-leaning candidate, Viktor Yushchenko.  From 
the Russian prospective, it is believed that the US interfered in the election on behalf of 
Yushchenko, eventually allowing his victory in a run-off.192  “From Peter the Great to Stalin, 
Russia has always been an empire.”193 This concept, not novel to the citizenry of the Russian 
Federation, is the basis upon which the Russian “sphere of influence” ideology is based.  Ukraine 
has been historically linked to Russia as a state within this sphere of influence and during the 
USSR period, one of the largest and most important SSRs in the Union.  “Ukraine has been a 
part of the Soviet Union or Russian Empire, unofficially, since the 1700s.”194  Even today, 
Ukraine is a uniquely strategic key among European countries in terms of Russian partnerships.  
“The second-largest European country, with a population of over forty-five million, Ukraine is a 
valuable strategic prize positioned astride the major transit corridor for Russian oil and gas into 
Europe.”195  Regardless of the merit of US interference in the 2004 Ukrainian presidential 
election, the Russian Federation and Putin must have felt that the victory of the US-leaning 
candidate marked the slipping of Ukraine out from the Russian sphere.  Much later in 2014, 
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Putin would drop all guises of rhetoric and refer to Ukraine as “Novorossiya” (“New Russia”, in 
English) and say “Kharkiv, Lugansk, Donetsk, Odessa we not part of Ukraine in Tsarist times, 
they were transferred in 1920.  Why?  God knows.”196  
 The year following Yushchenko’s victory for the presidency of Ukraine, NATO began 
discussions of extending a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia and Ukraine.  “From 
2005, Russian ire in this regard was focused increasingly on the prospect of Georgia and Ukraine 
becoming NATO members.”197  The idea that NATO would expand not just up to the borders of 
Russia herself, but also into states which Russia saw as within their sphere of influence for 
nearly three hundred years may have been too great a perceived injustice for Putin to take. 
 Putin would now begin his warnings to the US and the world of his displeasure with the 
current state, and hinting toward the use of his newly consolidated power.  In 2006, speaking 
before his national assembly (the combined houses of the Duma and the Federal Council, akin to 
the US’ state of the union address) Putin said, “far from everyone has abandoned the old bloc 
mentality and the prejudices inherited from the era of global confrontation despite the great 
changes that have taken place.  This is also a great hindrance in working together to find suitable 
responses to the common problems we face.”198  Putin, alluding to the expansion of NATO as a 
remnant of the “old bloc mentality” and the counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan as “common 
problems we face”, was issuing his first message to the west – further NATO expansion will not 
be tolerated.  Putin did not hang his speech on the single complaint, he continued with, “key 
disarmament issues are all but off the international agenda, and yet it is too early to speak of an 
end to the arms race.  What’s more, the arms race has entered a new spiral today with the 
achievement of new levels of technology that raise the danger of the emergence of a whole 
arsenal of so-called destabilizing weapons.”199 
 Putin’s warnings would truly take center stage in 2007 at the Munich Conference on 
Security Policy.  He said, without specifically citing the US, “I consider that the unipolar model 
is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world. […] What is even more important 
is that the model itself is flawed because at its basis there is and can be no moral foundations for 
modern civilization.”200  He continued with, “and of course this is extremely dangerous.  It 
results in the fact that no one feels safe.  I want to emphasize this – no one feels safe!  Because 
no one can feel that international law is like a stone wall that will protect them.  Of course such a 
policy stimulates an arms race.”201 
 Of note, Putin holds many of the bygone Soviet principles of security to be truths.  
Specifically called out in Munich, Putin shows that he believes unipolarity is a naturally unstable 
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system.  A belief that centers on the fact that a unipolar system lacks checks on the superpower 
atop the system where as a bipolar or multipolar system keeps all, including the superpowers at 
its top, in check through the “presupposition of the enemy”.202  The theory rests on the idea that 
the superpowers atop the bipolar or multipolar system exist in a state of “priori hostility” – a 
state where each side is “shackled to a continuation of the mutual hostage based on mutual 
deterrence that characterized the Cold War so that it cannot act unilaterally.”203  In Munich, Putin 
explained, “The use of force can only be considered legitimate if the decision is sanctioned by 
the UN.  And we do not need to substitute NATO or the EU for the UN.”204 
 In a second warning that Putin does not respect the recent actions of NATO, he alludes to 
the continued enlargement.  “And now they are trying to impose new dividing lines and walls on 
us.  These walls may be virtual but they are nevertheless dividing, ones that cut through our 
continent.”205  Judging by Putin’s belief of bipolarity “they” can only refer to the US, the enemy 
in the system.  In claiming the walls to be “virtual”, Putin is simply saying that in lieu of 
concrete structures, like the Berlin Wall erected by the Soviet Union, these dividing lines are 
along alliances, treaties, and “spheres of influence”. 
 In 2008, Putin would find a reason to use his acquired power.  In April of 2008, Georgia 
and Ukraine were told that their MAPs for NATO membership would be forthcoming later that 
year.  Even without Russian interference, the approval of Georgia would have been a difficult 
proposition.  In the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russian troops, 
branded as “peacekeepers” had been stationed previously under the purpose of “ensuring ethnic 
Russian’s safety”.  When Georgian forces moved to quell growing tensions in South Ossetia, the 
Russians reported that their Peacekeepers had suffered casualties at the hands of the 
Georgians.206  At this point, Russia deployed a much larger contingent of troops into the region, 
deployed the Black Sea Fleet to support, and began the overt mission of “restoring the peace”.  
Albeit not covertly, but surely not under the original intent of their mission, Russia forces began 
to destroy Georgian forces’ seized military equipment.  Additionally, in August of 2008, the 
Russian Federation recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and began 
formal diplomatic relationships with both.207  These two actions crushed Georgia’s hopes of 
receiving a MAP, since Georgia could no longer attest it was upholding two requirements to 
NATO membership, namely that it had no outstanding border disputes and that it could 
contribute militarily to NATO activities.208  Putin had successfully stopped NATO’s enlargement 
towards Russia’s borders, at least in the south. 
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 Vladimir Putin’s consolidation of power has been nothing short of methodical.  His 
ability in the first four years of his presidency to seize control of industry, information flows, the 
legislative process, and the military was a highly orchestrated and calculated undertaking.  
Further, if any question as to the level of control Putin was actually able to seize within the 
Russian Federation existed, his words in 2006 to his Federal Assembly and in 2007 to the 
Munich Conference on Security Policy should have served to quash doubts.  Additionally, his 
words clearly showed to what international norms and values he was willing to commit the force 
of his Federation’s power, those to which he was not. 
 The Russian Federation’s actions in Georgia also stand as a striking example of the 
capability of the Federation to disrupt or outright block the actions of the west.  Putin holds firm 
that unilateralism, or at least any system that doesn’t support Russian interests as of the highest 
levels of consideration, as inherently destabilizing.  NATO’s enlargement to bordering states of 
the Russian Federation and therefore into its “sphere of influence” historically is clearly a 
violation of his bipolar system view. 
 From 2000-2008, Putin consolidated vast amounts of power within the Russian 
Federation, distorting the democracy that it attests to being.  Further, Putin moved so quickly in 
this period that he was able to not just centralize this power, but also wield it against the west’s 
intentions by subverting Georgia’s hopes of joining the NATO alliance.  Amazingly, regardless 
of the similarities between the 2008 Georgia and 2014 Ukraine affairs, most of the west would 
not see the later coming and would stand in amazement as the Russian Federation once again 
exerted its influence in a state which it sees “Novorossiya”, by creating a de facto territorial 
dispute and by destroying or seizing large caches of military equipment. 
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